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Should AIDS Research Be Regulated?




Since the early 1980's, universities, private pharmaceutical companies, and
the federal and state governments have searched for drugs effective in the
treatment, prevention, and cure of acquired immune deficiency syndrome
("AIDS").' While a number of drug treatments have been marketed during
this period, no effective vaccination or cure has been discovered. Casualties
related to AIDS have mounted quickly, and estimates of the number of
persons currently infected, as well as projections of future infection, are
daunting.2 AIDS is currently the number one killer of both men and women
aged twenty-five to forty-four in many large U.S. cities.3 Increasing numbers
of people with AIDS ("PWA's"), or people who have tested positive for the
HIV virus, are engaged in a psychologically devastating race with the research
and development clock, over which they have little or no control.4
Frustration about the sluggish progress of AIDS research5 has coalesced
into especially potent political action. AIDS activists have been able to
galvanize political forces in unprecedented ways, largely because of several
peculiar characteristics of the disease. The period between infection and
manifestation of symptoms of AIDS is long. Typically, studies cite the
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania; Assistant Professor, Legal Environment of Business, Umversity of Texas at Austin. Ph.D.,
1990, M.A., 1986, The Wharton School of the Umversity of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1980, The College of
William and Mary; M.A., 1980, Dartmouth College; B.A., 1977, Hofstra University.
1. For a detailed examination of the history of the development of AIDS and various private and
public responses in the area of drug treatment, see Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Pricing: In Search
ofa Policy, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 691,691-99 (1993) [hereinafter Salbu, AIDS and Drug Pricing]. Because
the history of the pharmaceutical industry in relation to the AIDS crisis is examined m this earlier work,
I refer readers there in order to avoid redundancy.
2. The Centers for Disease Control estimate that over one-half million Americans will be
diagnosed with AIDS, and at least 330,000 Americans will have died from AIDS by 1995. Id., Amanda
Husted, CDC: 330,000 Americans Will Die from AIDS by 1995, AwL. CONST., Jan. 15, 1993, at D3.
3. Richard M. Selik et al., HlVInfection as Leading Cause of Death Among Young Adults in U.S.
Cities and States, 270 JAMA 2991 (1993). AIDS is the leading cause of death of men aged 25-44 in
64 U.S. cities, and of women aged 25-44 in nine U.S. cities. For further demographic information
regarding AIDS mortality and morbidity rates relative to other diseases as of February, 1993, see Profile
of the AIDS Pandemic, 1993, GENESIs REP., Feb. 1993, at 36.
4. For an autobiographical account of one couple's experience, see PAUL MONETIE, BORROWED
TIME: AN AIDS MEMOIR (1988).
5. Following the Ninth International Conference on AIDS, held in Berlin during the summer of
1993, Dr. Michael H. Merson, Director of the AIDS Program of the World Health Organization,
described AIDS research progress as "desperately slow." Lawrence K Altman, Little Progress Seen in
Effort to Crack AIDS Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1993, § 1, at 5.
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average time from infection to appearance of symptoms as ten years.6
Moreover, incidence of AIDS has been pronounced among male homosexuals,
a group whose political presence has become increasingly well organized
since the Stonewall riots introduced the gay rights movement in 1969 '
Because a large segment of persons at risk are politically well organized,'
and because many people diagnosed as HIV-positive remain healthy, able, and
motivated to activism for many years, 9 political pressure for more effective
research and development of AIDS drugs has been significant.'0
While criticism of both public and private responses to the AIDS epidemic
has been multi-faceted," one crucial concern has been the perception that
progress has been impeded by a failure to organize collaborative research
efforts with reasonable speed.' 2 In 1988, activist and author Larry Kramer
berated Tony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases, for failing to allocate expediently hundreds of millions
of dollars, and for failing to establish promptly a system for testing experi-
mental drug treatments on willing subjects.'" While some critics have
6. The long latency period following HIV infection increases the stakes in research that may yield
effective treatment prior to the appearance of symptoms. See Salvatore T. Butera & Thomas M. Folks,
Application of Latent HIV-1 Infected Cellular Models to Therapeutic Intervention, 8 AIDS RES. HUM.
RETROViRUSES 991, 991 (1992) ("The 10-year period of clinical latency following infection with the
human immunodeficiency virus type-I remains as a tremendous opportunity for therapeutic
intervention."). For farther discussion of latency of AIDS symptoms in persons infected with HIV, see
Daniel P Bednarik & Thomas M. Folks, Mechanisms of HIV-1 Latency, 6 AIDS 3 (1992), and Douglas
S. Goodin et al., Long Latency Event-Related Potentials in Patients Infected with Human Immunodefi-
czency Virus, 27 NEUROL. 414 (1990).
7. For example, estimates of attendance at the 1993 March on Washington for Gay Rights range
from 300,000 to 1.1 million. Among the political issues considered most crucial by participants were
the ban against gays in the military and AIDS funding. Frank Trejo, Thousands March in D.C. for Gay
Rights; Participants Hope to Affect Military Ban, Aids Funding, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Apr. 26,
1993, at IA.
8. Steven Epstein, Democratic Science? AIDS Activism and the Contested Construction of
Knowledge, SOCIALIST REV., Apr.-June 1991, at 35, 41.
9. Id. at 41-42.
10. For discussion of the political pressures of gay rights activists on the Clinton Administration,
see Paul Richter, Clinton and Gays Hold Historic Meeting, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at A2.
AIDS activism has brought the discussion of science into the public arena to an unprecedented extent.
See, e.g., Jon Cohen, Debate on AIDS Origin: Rolling Stone Weighs In, 255 Sci. 1505 (1992) (wherein
a commentator in SCIENCE, a highly regarded academic publication of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, reacts to an AIDS theory espoused in an article appearing m ROLLING STONE
magazine) [hereinafter Cohen, Debate on AIDS].
11. See, e.g., Terence Monmaney, TheAIDS Crisis: Placing the Blame, DISCOVER, Feb. 1988, at
60-62 (discussing critics' responses to AIDS, which have attributed delay to such phenomena as
government neglect, apathy, underfunding, and media silence).
The final report of the National Commission on AIDS, commissioned in 1989 and issued on June
28, 1993, criticizes President Clinton for his sluggish response to the AIDS crisis, lack of leadership,
and failure to implement coordination of AIDS activities. AIDS: AN EXPANDING TRAGEDY, Final Report
of the National Commission on AIDS, June 28, 1993.
12. For discussion of criticism of failure to organize anti-AIDS programs and research at the federal
level, see Larry Kramer, All-Out Federal Effort Needed to Defeat AIDS, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July
17, 1990, at 15A.
13. Larry Kramer, An Open Letter to Dr. Anthony Fauci, VILLAGE VOICE, May 31, 1988, at 18
(quoting Rep. Henry Waxman at an April 29, 1988, House Subcommittee on Human Resources meeting,
"Dr. Fauci, your own drug selection committee has named 24 drugs as high priority for development
and trials. As best I can tell, II of these 24 are not in trials yet. Why the delays? I understand the
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lamented underfunding of AIDS research,14 much criticism, like Kramer's,
highlights the inefficient use of existing funds, particularly the failure to
centralize and coordinate research efforts. 15
Centralizing AIDS policy under a federal "AIDS Czar" has been explored
as a means of enhancing the comprehensiveness of research and development
("R&D") efforts. The idea dates at least to 1987, when Admiral James D.
Watkins became Chair of President Reagan's Presidential Commission on the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus epidemic. 6 Watkins criticized the Commis-
sion's previous lack of a strategic plan and its failure to hire an executive
director under his predecessor, Dr. W Eugene Mayberry Moreover, he
suggested that the Federal Government under President Reagan was failing to
establish a "unified comprehensive discrete policy in response to the HIV
epidemic."' 7 Commentators began to discuss the merits of appointing
Watkins as an unofficial AIDS czar.'"
More recently, President Clinton named Krlstine Gebbie as the first official
AIDS Czar, or White House "AIDS Policy Coordinator." 9 While President
Clinton noted that the move was part of an initiative to "redouble our
government's efforts to promote research, fundiiig and treatment for
AIDS,"2 Gebbie's role and its attendant powers have not yet been specified.
During the announcement of Gebbie's appointment, President Clinton noted
that the assignment would "ensure that one person in the White House
need to do what you call 'setting priorities' but it appears even with your own scientists' choices, the
trials are not going on.") [hereinafter An Open Letter].
14. See Robert Pear, As AIDS Money is Parceled Out, Political Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
1993, § 4, at 3 (quoting Dr. Martin S. Hirsch, director of AIDS research at the Massachusetts General
Hospital, "There is not shortage of infected individuals. There is no shortage of investigators willing to
test these agents. There is no shortage of agents or combinations of agents ready to be tested. The
shortage is in funding capability to do these studies.").
For discussion of inadequacies in AIDS funding, see Allan M. Brandt, AIDS: From Social History
to Social Policy, 14 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 231, 238 (1986).
For an opposing viewpoint, see William Booth, No Longer Ignored, AIDS Funds Just Keep Growing,
242 Sci. 858 (1988) (discussing the rise of AIDS funding in recent years to high levels relative to
overall federal health spending) [hereinafter Booth, No Longer Ignored].
15. See An Open Letter, supra note 13, at 18 (charging Anthony Fauci with using underfunding as
an excuse for alleged incompetence and with having failed to utilize effectively a $374 million budget
allocated to AIDS treatment research over four years).
For discussion of government's failure to respond adequately and quickly to AIDS, see generally
RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987).
16. Sally Squires, Setting the Course on AIDS: How an Admiral Turned Around the President's
AIDS Commission, WASH. POST, June 7, 1988, Health, at 15.
17. Taunya L. Banks, AIDS and Government: A Plan of Action? Report of the Presidential
Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1321, 1333 n.62
(1989).
18. Id. at 1334 n.69.





oversees and unifies government-wide AIDS efforts,"'2' a task that could
conceivably entail a wide array of possible roles and activities. 22
The title "Policy Coordinator" suggests a role potentially limited to heading
efforts towards a cohesive national strategic plan for AIDS. The moniker
"AIDS Czar" certainly connotes more plenipotentiary powers. For example,
an AIDS Czar, operating within the confines of an adopted plan, also could
orchestrate a coordinated network of research efforts to furth,;r that plan. The
notion of an AIDS Czar has sometimes encompassed extreme authority, such
as the power to commandeer any publicly funded resources.23
A. Congressional Responses to the Call for Increased
Centralization of AIDS Research
In March of 1993, in order to fill gaps and eliminate redundancies, 24 both
the House and the Senate proposed versions of a National Institutes of Health
Revitalization Act, providing the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") Office
of AIDS Research with a full-time Director to develop a strategic plan to
centralize AIDS reseaich. 25 To ensure that distribution of funding complies
with the strategic plan, the bills require NIH funds to be channeled through
a centralized coordinating office before reaching research institutes. 26 Under
the House version, the Director of the NIH decides how to allocate funds;
under the Senate version, the Office of AIDS Research makes those
21. Spencer Rich, Clinton Names Health Ex-Official First AIDS Policy Coordinator, WASH. POST,
June 26, 1993, at A2.
22. In an interview following her appointment, Gebbie was quoted as stating that one of her first
tasks will be to "find a couple of issues that we can move on very quickly so that we won't look like
we're doing nothing." New AIDS Czar Gebbie Tackles Tough Position, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 1993, § 3,
at 23.
This statement is disturbing in its implication that public relations management may take precedence
over well-considered public policy development, as politics supersede scientific considerations in the
administration's treatment of the AIDS crisis.
23. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text; see also Laurie Garrett, AIDS: The Search for
a Cure, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 17, 1991, City, at 7 (quoting AIDS activist Larry Kramer, "A general has
to be put in charge of the army, and he or she has got to be given emergency powers to cut through all
the red tape that prevents research from being entered into in this country. I'm talking about a
Manhattan Project. It's as simple as that.").
24. The notion that centralization of research will reduce investigative redundancies, thereby
enhancing research efficiency, may be a dangerous one. Sociologist Robert Merton has suggested that
duplications occurring in competing laboratories may be beneficial in a number of ways. Overlapping
research may expedite the ultimate accretion of knowledge by lending credibility and validation to
overlapping findings, and by allowing pluralistic interpretations ofsimilar data, improving the likelihood
of accurate explanations of observed phenomena. Moreover, the existence of partial redundancies may
in fact reflect the incremental alterations of experimentation typical of gradual scientific progress.
ROBERT K. MERTON, Multiple Discoveries as Strategic Research Site, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE:
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 371-82 (1973).
25. For the House version, see H.R. 4, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). For the Senate version, see
S. REP. NO. 2, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
26. Under current procedures, funds are distributed directly from the NIH to research institutes,
without a centralized filtering process by the Office of AIDS Research. Whereas the House version of
the bill proposes centralization of AIDS research funding through a facility independent of existing NIH
authorities, the Senate version retains NIH distribution of funds.
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decisions.27 Whereas the NIH's sixteen institutes currently determine their
own research agendas independently, the Aouse and Senate bills shift
decision-making about the content and nature of research programs to the
centralized unit, either the NIH under the House bill, or the Office of AIDS
Research under the Senate bill.2" Heads of the NIH and other critics opposed
the bills, suggesting that the delay in allocating funds may actually impede the
progress of AIDS research.29
More recently, both the House and the Senate have approved a compromise
bill.30 The bill has characteristics of both the original Senate and House
versions: The Director of the Office of AIDS Research is responsible for
distributing funds in accordance with the terms of the original Senate
proposal.3 The final bill contains time limits, restricting the period during
which the Office can retain funds prior to distribution. Funds for continuing
and non-competing grants must be distributed within fifteen days of receipt
by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,32 and funds for
new and competing grants must be distributed within thirty days3 of receipt.
In addition, the bill establishes an emergency discretionary account, not to
exceed $25 million per year, from which the Director will be able to fund
projects that arise unforeseeably from ongoing developments. 4
B. The Pharmaceutical Industry's Response to the Call for
Increased Centralization of AIDS Research
As the House and Senate responded to critical demands for the centraliza-
tion of publicly funded AIDS research through a national planning mecha-
nism, private corporations have reacted to pressures on the pharmaceutical
industry to expedite research efforts through centralization and collaboration.
In April of 1993, in an effort to expedite drug development, fifteen pharma-
ceutical companies announced plans to increase collaboration and information
sharing in regard to experimental AIDS treatments.35 The collaborators,
comprising a group called the Inter-Company Collaboration for AIDS Drug
Development, were to begin meeting in the summer of 1993, and planned to
27. See supra note 25.
28. See S. RP. No. 2, supra note 25, at 9.
29. Stephen Burd, Proposal to Centralize AIDS Research Draws Fire, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb.
24, 1993, at A24 [hereinafter Burd, Proposal].
30. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Title XVIII, 107 Stat. (amending Public
Health Service Act), Pub. L. No. 103-43, 1993 H.R. 2518 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300cc
(1993)).
31. Id. § 2353(d)(3)(A), 107 Stat. 195.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 2353(d)(3)(B), 107 Stat. 195.
34. Id. § 2356(a)(2), 107 Stat. 197.




convene approximately six times per year.3 6 Members 7 will share clinical
data and drug supplies, but will not share basic HIV research." The Inter-
Company Collaboration has been characterized as noncommercial, reflecting
a decision to share information without joint ownership of medical discover-
ies, so that each company will have exclusive proprietary rights to any
compound it discovers. 9
The decision of pharmaceutical companies to collaborate was based partly
on frustration over the sluggish pace of progress. Moreover, recent research
findings suggest that individual drug treatments typically become subject to
viral resistance, arid therefore effective treatment is most likely to result from
combination therapy 40 If our best hopes for a successful treatment or cure
depend upon the simultaneous combination of numerous drug therapies,
cooperation among pharmaceutical companies is likely to expedite the
discovery of effective matches. By sharing information, companies may be
able to experiment sooner with greater numbers of combinations of drugs,
particularly unpatented drugs, which are ordinarily developed in secrecy
C. Legal and Public Policy Issues Regarding
the Centralization of AIDS Research
While these efforts at centralization and collaboration have the potential to
promote AIDS drug research, a number of questions regarding law and public
policy remain. Should the Federal Government develop a centralized strategic
plan to allocate its funds for AIDS research?4 If so, how can this be
accomplished without unnecessary bureaucratic delay9 Would a federal
strategic plan, developed to organize and coordinate funding decisions under
the umbrella of one comprehensive program, suffice to optimize AIDS
research effectiveness? Or are more Draconian measures warranted?
Recommendations have included the creation of a "Manhattan Project for
,36. 15 Drug Firms Announce Alliance on AIDS, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at D2.
37. Founding members include Merck, Eli Lilly, Astra, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Boehringer Ingelhem,
Burroughs Wellcome, DuPont Merck, Glaxo, Hoechst, Roche, Miles Laboratories, Pfizer, Sigma Tan,
and SmithKline Beecham. At the time of the announcement, Abbot Laboratories and Upjohn were two
major pharmaceutical companies absent from the list. Waldholz, supra note 35.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. For discussion of this trend, see Liz Hunt, Drug Firms Unite to Find AIDS Cure, INDEPENDENT,
Apr. 22, 1993, Home News, at 3; John Rennie, Triple Whammy: Will an AIDS Therapy Live Up to its
Advance Billing?, Sci. AM., May 1993, at 18.
For scientific discussion of the utilization of combination therapy for the treatment of HIV, see Yung-
Kang Chow et al., Use of Evolutionary Limitations of HIV-1 Multidrug Resistance to Optimize Therapy,
361 NATuRE 650 (1993); Gail Skowron et al., Alternating and Intermittent Regimens of Zidovudine and
Dideoxycytidine in Patients with AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex, 118 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 321
(1993).
41. The question of federal strategic AIDS policy has been addressed frequently m the press, where
treatment is naturally cursory, but infrequently in the academic literature. See, e.g., Edward N. Brandt,
Jr., Government Involvement and the Development of Public Policy in AIDS Research and Reporting,
in AIDS AND PATIENT MANAGEMENT: LEGAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES 36 (William D. Witt ed.,
1986).
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AIDS," potentially entailing governmental oversight of lab activity42 and
powers to appropriate federally funded lab equipment and staff utilization.43
In the area of corporate research and development, is information sharing
enough, or should pharmaceutical companies go further, by sharing basic
HIV-research findings, and perhaps even collaborating in joint testing and
experimentation? Or is there a point at which collaborative efforts become
anti-competitive, thereby reducing individual companies' initiatives and
incentives to engage in constructive research? What role can joint ventures
play in reconciling the tensions between competitive and coordinative
benefits? And what policies should the government adopt in order to promote
useful joint venture activity? These questions of public policy relate to the
legal literature and theory of antitrust.
This Article examines these legal challenges in detail. Part I investigates the
recommendation, increasingly mentioned but rarely examined by AIDS
activists and politicians, that the Federal Government create a "Manhattan
Project for AIDS."" The discussion concludes that proponents have failed
to analyze the Manhattan Project model carefully, and have made cavalier and
ill-considered recommendations that cannot be justified under careful scrutiny
In particular, I suggest that potential differences between the original and
proposed Manhattan Projects render the analogy suspect in its application to
the AIDS crisis.
Part II explores the nature of competition and cooperation as they affect
scientific research. The discussion focuses on the dysfunctional effects that
may result from excessive government coordination and control over AIDS
research, including impairment of adversarial pluralism and diversity of
perspectives, exacerbation of bureaucratic impediments to research, and
diminution of competitive incentives that drive scientific races.
Part III contains a proposal for the achievement of greater cohesiveness and
better organization of AIDS research through limited or restrained government
coordination. The proposal falls short of the extreme measure of establishing
a "Manhattan Project for AIDS." The recommendation focuses on enhancing
the use of government funding while retaining the characteristics of laboratory
autonomy and decentralized decision-making. This focus thereby avoids some
of the pitfalls inherent in excessive coordination, as discussed in Part I, while
it increases the likelihood of discovering AIDS treatments more quickly and
efficiently
Part IV examines in detail the ways in which joint ventures and strategic
networks can provide the benefits of increased collaboration, as demanded by
activists and politicians, without incurring the dysfunctional side-effects of a
Manhattan Project.
Part V examines the current antitrust laws as they apply to joint ventures
and other strategic alliances. I explain why ventures engaged in the present
42. See infra text accompanying note 122.
43. See infra text accompanying note 122.
44. See infra note 46.
1994]
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basic research stage of AIDS investigation entail little or no anti-competitive
risk, while antitrust laws create a chilling effect on potentially valuable
cooperative arrangements. Accordingly, Part V concludes by recommending
that AIDS research be exempt from application of certain antitrust laws.
The Conclusion suggests that an overriding principle suffuses all the
recommendations in this Article, a principle that should become a mainstay
of any regulatory policies regarding AIDS research: While collaboration is
vital to the advancement of science and the expedient eradication of AIDS,
compulsory cooperation should exist only in restrained forms, and preferably
as a natural by-product of competition within free and open scientific markets.
I. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH
A MANHATTAN PROJECT FOR AIDS
In assessing the value of centralized AIDS policy, it is helpful to differenti-
ate between forms of coordination. The form recently approved by Congress,
which entails the development of a centralized strategic plan for the allocation
of NIH resources, is a relatively moderate version of government coordina-
tion.45 More extreme proposals include the development of a nationally
managed research program, under which the government would facilitate and
orchestrate collaborative efforts. Such a policy would surpass NIH strategic
planning, as its scope and span of control would exceed the basic function of
rationalizing the allocation of fiscal resources. I shall label the recently
approved Congressional approach "restrained coordination," and I shall refer
to more extremist calls for governmental intervention, such as proposals for
a Manhattan Project for AIDS, as "unrestrained coordination." Proponents of
unrestrained coordination cite the severity and intransigence of the AIDS
crisis as justification for taking extraordinary measures. Most frequently, they
call for a modern-day Manhattan Project to expedite the search for. effective
treatments." Just as the crisis of World War II brought the world's top
scientists together in an effort to develop an atomic bomb, so a cure for AIDS
would ostensibly be hastened by a centralized, coordinated effort, uniting all
the best minds in the field of viral research under one administrative
45. See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
46. The idea of a Manhattan Project for AIDS arises with increasing frequency, predominantly in
informal discussions or criticisms of AIDS research policy. See, e.g., Pear, supra note 14, at 3 (quoting
Peter Staley, of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power, "If we had a Manhattan Project Against AIDS,
we might find one or more therapies that would halt the virus in its tracks."); see also Garrett, supra
note 23, at 7 (quoting activist and author Larry Kramer's call for a Manhattan Project for AIDS); Philip
J. Hilts, Into the Maelstrom, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1993, § I, at 23 (citing President Clinton's reference
to the need to establish a Manhattan Project for AIDS).
Some critics have warned against centralization of AIDS research in the form of a Manhattan Project-
style collaboration effort. See Christopher B. Daly, Generations Will Suffer AIDS, Scientist Asserts,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 13, 1993, at A3 (refemng to a statement by William Haseltine, of the Dana-Farber
Cancer Institute, that "[t]oo many basic questions are unknown for an overall commander to begin
assigning tasks.").
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umbrella.47 Suggested benefits of such an effort include the elimination of
both research redundancy and research gaps.48
In this Part, I begin a critical examination of unrestrained coordination by
asking whether the success of the Manhattan Project predicts, by analogy, the
likely success of a Manhattan Project for AIDS. To proceed, we as a society
must understand the nature and extent of collaboration under the original
World War II prototype. The Manhattan Project was an extreme and radical
departure from the usual norms of scientific project management in the United
States. Previously autonomous investigators, accustomed under ordinary
circumstances to having relatively unfettered control over the management of
their laboratories, were placed under military administrative authority.49
Scientists were directed in regard to the projects they were to pursue, the
collaborators with whom they were to work, the flow of information pertinent
to their research progress and findings, and the use of laboratory resources.
By virtue of these extraordinary administrative powers, the Manhattan Project
greatly exceeded the limited planning functions of restrained coordination.
Recommendations favoring a Manhattan Project for AIDS are, therefore,
recommendations for extreme and unrestrained government intervention, in
which the usual academic freedoms of scientific investigators would be
substantially curtailed.
Is highly centralized government authority over research on AIDS analogous
to coordination of the Manhattan Project during World War II? The analogy
is seductive, particularly given the ultimate success of the Manhattan Project
in the achievement of its assigned task. However, the proponents of
"Manhattan Project IIV5 have failed to examine the characteristics of the
first effort to determine whether the metaphor is aptly applied to the war
against AIDS. In the following subparts, I address some aspects of the
Manhattan Project that were peculiar to the exigencies of World War II. These
may affect the utility of unrestrained AIDS research coordination.
47. On the surface, the purpose of the Manhattan Project appears to be compatible with the
exigencies associated with AIDS research. Albert Einstein recommended coordination of research efforts.
to facilitate applied atomic research via gains in speed and scale. PETER WYDEN, DAY ONE 40 (1984).
48. Jon Cohen, A Manhattan Project for AIDS?, 259 SCi. 1112 (1993) [hereinafter Cohen, A
Manhattan Project].
49. Robert P. Crease & Nicholas P. Samios, Managing the Unmanageable, ATLANTic, Jan. 1991,
at 80.
50. I shall refer at times to a "Manhattan Project for AIDS" as "Manhattan Project II." There have
been several variants of the recommendation of a "Manhattan Project for AIDS." These include
programs outside the NIH consolidating all government-funded AIDS research, programs outside the
NIH with a budget for research contracts and a central facility leader, the creation of six research centers
of excellence affiliated with academic institutions, and a centrally located facility to bnng together
"divergent approaches" of scientists with "extraordinary powers" A Manhattan Project, supra note 48,
at 1113.
At this stage, people use the phrase "Manhattan Project for AIDS" indiscriminately and carelessly,
so that it appears to have differing meanings in various discussions. See Research Advances in AIDS
War, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO TRANsciPTr, Weekend Edition, June 13, 1993 (quoting Robert Gallo,
of the National Cancer Institute, discussing proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference on AIDS in
1993: "Several people at the meeting and before this meeting have referred to [a] Manhattan Project but
different people mean different things by that.").
1994]
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A. The Success of the Manhattan Project May Be Attributable
to Factors Other than Government Coordination of Research
Before concluding that unrestrained centralization of AIDS research is
a good strategy, we must examine whether such coordination was the only
distinctive characteristic of the Manhattan Project. The success of that historic
effort may be attributable to unique characteristics other than centraliza-
tion-characteristics that may not be shared by a similar program for AIDS.
For example, one plausible explanation of the success of the Manhattan
Project is the remarkable level of public funding that it received compared to
virtually all other scientific research projects, including health crisis initiatives
like polio and AIDS research.5 Manhattan Project physicist Raemer
Schreiber describes the unique experience of doing scientific research with
virtually unlimited funding: "Since many of us came from university labs
where the research budget was very, very limited, it was a very heady thing
to be able to order something that cost $50,000 and you got it in a few
days. 52
Consider this comparison: Whereas the Manhattan Project received two
billion dollars of funding (in 1940 dollars) over a period of a few years,53
the entire federal budget for health care R&D in 1956 was a mere $81 million
(in 1988 dollars).54 This latter figure represents all areas of federally
supported medical research, including federal funding for the first field test
of Salk's polio vaccination.55 The juxtaposition of these figures suggests at
least two hypothetical sources of the Manhattan Project's success: government
orchestration of collaboration, or return on a supernormal investment, or a
combination of both.
In reality, government orchestration and supernormal investment are but two
of many possible factors that may explain the efficacy of the Manhattan
Project. In addition, successful government centralization of a research project
may depend upon an interactive effect of numerous factors. Consider, for
example, that the Manhattan Project was initiated after the requisite basic
research findings were in place, 6 findings that indicated that the
5 i. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimsom ordered General Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan
Project, to develop the atomic bomb without consideration to cost. DAN KURZMAN, DAY OF THE BOMB
75 (1986).
No unconditional government mandate has been given to find a cure for AIDS regardless of cost. The
success of the Manhattan Project may have been a finction of unbounded funding rather than
centralization of research and development.
52. Sue M. Holmes, Birth of a Bomb: 50 Years Ago, Manhattan Project Lighted Fuse on Atomic
Weapon, AUSTrN AMER.-STATESMAN, June 17, 1993, at A20.
53. GORDON THOMAS & MAX M. WiTTs, ENOLA GAY 8 (1977).
54. SANDRA PANEM, THE AIDS BUREAUCRACY 54 (1988).
55. Id.
56. Most descnptions of the Manhattan Project attribute its viability to the relatively advanced stage
of research, and to the opinion that sufficient knowledge had already been amassed to render imminent
the production of an atomic bomb. See, e.g., RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB
357-93 (1986); MARTIN J. SHERWIN, A WORLD DESTROYED: THE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE GRAND
ALLIANCE 13-39 (1975).
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development of an atomic weapon was imminent." Whereas the Manhattan
Project entailed the application of an existing mathematical model to the
development of the bomb, the basic models upon which a cure or vaccine for
AIDS might be built do not presently exist.5"
Perhaps government-orchestrated research can be effective, but only when
interacting with a critical mass of capital and a mature state of pre-existing
basic research findings. 9 If this hypothesis were accurate, centralized
research would be ineffective and premature at the present stage of AIDS
research because there is insufficient foundational progress for the effective
60 osrainexploitation of substantial government intervention. Such observations
certainly do not prove the inefficacy of federally coordinated research, nor do
they necessarily impeach the theory that such efforts were the primary cause
of the Manhattan Project's success. Rather, they suggest that we must be
careful not to attribute causality where none has been proven. In particular,
we must consider several important caveats before rushing precipitously into
unrestrained federal coordination of AIDS research.
Alternative theories to the coordination theory, such as a hypernormal-
levels-of-funding theory, may in fact explain the Manhattan Project's success.
Because there are no comparison data, we cannot ascertain what factors
account for the Manhattan Project's success. Without manipulation of
variables and appropriate controls, we cannot determine which factor, or
which combination of many factors, effected the successful completion of the
Project's mission.6'
Deducing the efficacy of government coordinated research from the efficacy
of the Manhattan Project is statistically unsound. The Manhattan Project is a
57. Because AIDS research is at an earlier stage with regard to basic scientific knowledge, critics
suggest that "not enough is known about HIV at the level of basic science to stage a goal-onented
project like the one that led to the making of an atomic bomb, and that any attempt to do so could stifle
the scientific creativity needed to provide a cure or a vaccine." Cohen, A Manhattan Project, supra note
48, at 1112.
58. See id. at 1114 (quoting Mark Harrington, an AIDS Activist of New York's Treatment Action
Group, who admits that while predictions could be made on the mathematical models that existed prior
to the Manhattan Project, such predictions cannot currently be made in the application of biology to
AIDS); see also Afler Such Knowledge, ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 1993, at 80 (stating that much of the pure
science was already in place to support the Manhattan Project, a project which essentially entailed
technological research applications).
59. This hypothesis is not an irrational or particularly controversial one, considering that scientists
acknowledge the lack of basic scientific knowledge upon which effective applications for AIDS
treatment are likely to be developed in the near future. See supra note 5; see infra notes 124-25.
60. While the hypothesis is stated here as an example, it is one which highlights a fundamental
difference between the stages of advancement of the Manhattan Project and the proposed Manhattan
Project II. Such differences may be crucial ones, and should be investigated before we prescribe drastic
measures based on rash generalizations generated from one highly idiosyncratic historic event. What
worked under very special circumstances may or may not work under the circumstances surrounding
AIDS research.
61. Experimentation regarding the efficacy of centralized scientific projects is impracticable. A
cruder approach, the examination of a few such projects from the past, yields inconsistent findings. For
example, the work of the March of Dimes was effective in the fight against infantile paralysis in the
1930's, whereas Nixon's War on Cancer in the 1970's, which sought to evoke "the same kind of
concentrated effort that split the atom," failed to find a cure. Jon Cohen, History's Winners and Losers,
259 Sci. 1114, 1114 (1993).
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sample of one, not subject to observation within the norms of experimental
research. It is also unreliable as a representative case study from which to
glean anecdotal information. With any sample of one, it is impossible to
determine whether the phenomenon studied is typical or atypical, because
there are insufficient data from which to distinguish average cases from
extreme ones. As a result, it is dangerous to make generalized inferences
regarding centralized research from one arguably effective experience.6"
Perhaps most crucially, the Project's efficiency and effectiveness in
accomplishing the ends that were achieved are not susceptible to objective
proof. Without comparison data, all we can conclude is that the goal of
developing a bomb under time pressure was met. We cannot know, from the
limited data available, whether a better method existed. For example, while
unrestrained coordination did yield the necessary end product, it is possible
that restrained coordination would have yielded similar or superior results, at
the same or even lower costs.
B. Whereas the Manhattan Project Required Direct Government
Restriction of Information Flows, AIDS Research Progress
Depends upon Unrestrained Information Flows
Centralization was essential to the Manhattan Project goal of information
containment, which was achieved by imposing severe security restrictions.63
Because the search for an atomic bomb occurred within the context of a war,
the usual norms of scientific exchange were obscured and warped.' The goal
was not simply to invent an atomic bomb; rather, it was to invent an atomic
bomb under extraordinary conditions of stealth and secrecy, conditions which
were created by imposing severe limitations upon the usual scientific
intellectual environment.65 Collaborators formed an insulated world of their
own. Combinations and synergies were fostered within that world, and all
discoveries were carefully guarded and contained.
62. See FREDERICK E. CROXTON ET AL., APPLIED GENERAL STATISTICs 9 (1967) (discussing the
high probability that trends observed using small samples are attributable to chance).
63. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was obsessed with secrecy in regard to the operations of
the Manhattan Project. KURZMAN, supra note 51, at 78. The Project was considered to be so confidential
that an appropriations-related Senate investigation was blocked by Stimson and Groves, largely on the
basis of the supreme importance of secrecy. When Secretary of State James F Byrnes suggested a
review of the Project, Groves informed Stimson that he was willing to allow two senators and two
representatives to view "those things outside the secret processing areas which have been under constant
observation by the construction contractors and their personnel." THOMAS & Wrrrs, supra note 53, at
92-93.
64. The stealth of the Manhattan Project was such a high priority that many of the investigators
involved were unaware of the real purposes behind the research. For discussion of the "need to know"
policy of the Manhattan Project, see GREGG HERKEN, THE WINNING WEAPON: THE ATOMiC BoMB IN
THE COLD WAR, 1945-1950 110-11 (1982).
65. Security concerns were such a high priority that middle and lower level investigators were not
aware that a bomb was being developed. High level scientists referred during their work to "the gadget,"
in order to ensure the highest order of secrecy, even within the ranks of their own laboratories. See
Holmes, supra note 52.
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In essence, wartime conditions obstructed the operation of market dynamics
that ordinarily and optimally apply to the development of science. Competi-
tion was disqualified from its usual role as an impetus to creativity because
freely competitive laboratories are resistant to any realistic constraints on the
flow of information." As security was the highest priority, centralizing
research into one artificial universe was sensible. Coordination effected a
compromise between the need for stealth and the demand for teamwork and
interaction among scientific researchers. Because the ordinary exchange of
information in open research markets was of necessity curtailed, orchestration
of research was a necessary expedient. Whereas the invisible hand ordinarily
moderates the flow of information through freely chosen competitive and
cooperative arrangements between and among laboratories, a more visible
hand was required to arrange these flows under conditions of secrecy 67
It is plausible that the Manhattan Project resulted in the development of an
atomic bomb despite, rather than because of, centralized government
coordination. As Daniel S. Greenburg observes, Manhattan Project leader
General Leslie R. Groves's desire to compartmentalize knowledge in the
interests of security is an absurd and offensive incursion upon the traditions
of science." Greenberg notes that Groves's efforts to compartmentalize
research were "inevitably stretched or pushed aside by the pressures of getting
on with the job,"69 so that military organization of the Manhattan Project was
a nuisance, albeit one that fell short of being disabling. 0 If the Manhattan
Project succeeded by overcoming centralized organizational obstacles rather
than by exploiting centralized organizational benefits, it would be a grave
error to adopt intrusive federal AIDS policies on the basis of that earlier
example. As Part II explains, government coordination is an extraordinary
process under extant norms of scientific research-so much that the invisible
hand should be replaced by visible allocation of tasks and resources only
under extraordinary conditions.
66. The restriction of information flows is a severe departure from the ordinary norms of science.
Whereas publication incentives in the academy encourage the sharing of information under ordinary
conditions, and patent law encourages the dispersement of information in commercial laboratory settings,
the Manhattan Project was restricted from participating in normal scientific research activity because of
the need to protect information.
67. I borrow the idea of the visible hand freely here from business historian Alfred Chandler, who
recognized development of economic and industry manipulation in tandem with the rise of the large and
powerful corporation. ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
68. DANIEL S. GREENBURG, THE POLITICS OF PURE SCIENCE 88 (1967).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 89.
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C. While the Suspension of Laboratory Autonomy May Be
Appropriate at Late, Goal-Implementation Stages of
Research, It May Not Be
Appropriate at the Stage of Basic Research
Activists demanding a Manhattan Project cite frustrations with the
cumbersome, dilatory processes of science.7 They have subjected the
principles and procedures of normal science to unprecedented scrutiny,
rendering the scientific community more accountable for a critical examina-
tion of processes and controls that may impede the search to cure AIDS.72
Still, there are compelling reasons to retain the protocols of normal,
autonomous scientific research. In particular, it is vital that investigators
maintain scientific autonomy during the early stages of exploration, when they
seek the basic knowledge that forms the underpinnings of applied research.73
The need for investigative autonomy in conducting basic research, discussed
in detail in Part II, reflects the need to encourage pluralism rather than
narrowness at this stage.
If successful AIDS treatments would likely result from simply applying
proven scientific principles, efficiency would perhaps be optimized by
focusing all efforts along one uncontroverted path. Under such circumstances,
the development of the desired application would be essentially mechanical,
and therefore amenable to external management.
Unfortunately, AIDS research is currently far from the verge of mechanistic
applications. As a result, the scientific community must be allowed to
entertain a wide variety of theoretical approaches, one or more of which may
lead us to the basic scientific advances that will pave the way towards
eventual applied ends. Until then, a Manhattan Project II would be overly
confining. Rigidly classifying basic research projects would inhibit the
creative and innovative models that arise in a free and pluralistic scientific
community
D If the Manhattan Project Analogy Is Suspect, Skepticism
of a Manhattan Project I1 Is Appropriate
Given the observations in the preceding three subparts, we should be
reluctant to embrace a Manhattan Project II as the best R&D response to
AIDS. Before we decide that governmentally centralized research is optimal
under crisis conditions, we should be reasonably convinced that the Manhattan
71. Cohen, A Manhattan Project, supra note 48, at 1112.
72. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 49-51 (discussing the ability of AIDS activists to reduce the
insulation of the scientific community, and critically examining scientific protocols as social
constructions created in the context of political power dynamics).
73. Indeed, regulation of applied scientific research tends to be far more prevalent than regulation
of basic scientific research. For a discussion of the relative degrees of regulation of basic and applied
research, see Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEO. L.J. 1341
(1987).
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Project benefitted from government coordination, rather than mega-funding or
other alternative causes. We should also consider the possibility that the
Project would have been even more effective and efficient without coordina-
tion had the need for confidentiality not usurped that choice.
Ordinarily, we view government coordination of research as ineffective and
inefficient. Compare AIDS research with cancer research and heart research,
for example. Cancer and heart disease certainly can be considered health care
crises similar to the AIDS crisiS, 74 and therefore equally analogous to the
crisis of World War II. Yet there has been no serious consideration of a
Manhattan Project III to expedite the fight against cancer, or of a Manhattan
Project IV to speed the discovery of a cure for heart disease.
Why has there been a clamor for government coordination of AIDS research
but not for cancer or heart research? In all likelihood, the distinction is a
political one. Cancer patients and heart patients face their diseases in isolated
pockets. In contrast, many AIDS patients are politically well organized.7 6
Moreover, the gay community at large has embraced the fight against AIDS
as a crucial concern.77 There is no demographic equivalent among cancer or
heart patients to flex its muscle in the form of demands on the government for
change in R&D policy Because cancer patients and heart patients are not
organized, they have not placed comparable political pressure on governmen-
tal officials and entities.
The substance of political demands, particularly the demand for increased
organization of the fight against AIDS, is the product of a sense of helpless-
ness and chaos. Because the disease has remained inscrutable and untamed,
74. Heart disease is presently the number one cause of premature deaths in the United States.
Alexander Leaf, Preventive Medicine for Our Ailing Health Care System, 269 JAMA 616 (1993). In
1989, 497,850 persons died of heart disease in the United States. 1992 Heart and Stroke Facts, AMER.
HEART ASs'N PAMPHLET, 1991.
In contrast, 100,777 deaths from AIDS were reported to the Centers for Disease Control from 1981
through 1990. Mortality Attributable to HIVInfections/AIDS-United States, 1981-1990,265 JAMA 848
(1991).
Because AIDS-related and cancer-related deaths overlap, it is difficult to compare these two causes
of mortality. For discussion of AIDS-related deaths associated with cancer, see Andrew A. Skolnick &
Margaret A. Winker, Eleventh Annual Science Reporters Conference Offers Cornucopia of Medical
Research Stones, 268 JAMA 2620 (1992).
Statistics comparing heart disease-related and AIDS-related mortality are not intended to trivialize the
severity of the AIDS epidemic, but rather to suggest that while research challenges concerning heart
disease and AIDS are both compelling, there has been no call for government coordination of research
concerning heart disease. My hypothesis here is that the call for a Manhattan Project II for AIDS
research is a function of political clout and organization in the gay community.
75. If AIDS activists who demand government coordination of research are correct in the belief that
a more concerted effort will expedite the discovery of a cure, then such coordination would also be
likely to expedite discoveries of cures for cancer and heart disease. Either the entire competitive
capitalist system of research autonomy is faulty, or there are compelling reasons to avoid coercive
research programs-reasons which have been recognized through past experience, and incorporated into
the existing model.
76. Jeremy Pnpstem, When Science and Passion Meet: The Impact of AIDS on Research, CAN.
MED. Ass'N J., Feb. 15, 1993, at 638.




those most immediately affected want to exert more control over it.78
Unfortunately, the natural desire to seek control through expanded organiza-
tion is revealed as dysfunctional when examined beyond its appealing
surface.7 9
The nexus between centralization and effectiveness has not been proven. To
the contrary, evidence from organizational theory suggests that centralization
may be ineffective for high-innovation projects. Robert E. Quinn and John
Rohrbaugh, for example, have observed that cultures of flexibility are
associated with decentralization and differentiation, whereas cultures of
control are associated with centralization and integration.8" In accordance
with this model, decentralized authority over AIDS research may be
associated with flexibility and differentiation, typically sources of innovation,
whereas centralized government authority over AIDS research may be
associated with control and integration, potential inhibitors of creativity
A dysfunctional relationship between innovation and centralized authority
may explain why privatized, uncoordinated research is the received scientific
and commercial model in the United States. Proponents of the private system
contend that it is the most expedient method of ensuring scientific and
medical progress.8' If they are correct, then a political decision to adopt a
Manhattan Project II in response to the AIDS crisis would appease critics, but
at a possible cost of human suffering and lives. In the following Part, I
address the nature of science and the roles of competition, coordination, and
collaboration in scientific processes. By examining these dynamics, we can try
to understand the potential benefits and disadvantages of government
centralization in order to choose an AIDS policy based on rational expecta-
tions rather than political pressures.
78. Political pressure appears to be a driving force in increasing amounts of funding spent on AIDS
research. Julie Johnsson, CEOs: Politics Hurts Long-Term Medical Research, HosPITALS, Aug. 20,
1990, at 22. Yet, while political pressure may increase AIDS funding and thereby speed the process of
finding a cure, misguided political pressures favoring extreme centralization and coordination of research
may in fact have a negative impact on the search for a cure. Policy makers should avoid yielding to
knee-jerk political pressures and favoring policies the impact of which has not been fully considered.
79. In response to proposed legislation for the centralization of AIDS policy within the NIH, one
representative has observed, "I am concerned that enactment of this legislation we are debating today
will impede, and not enhance, the very fine work that is conducted by NIH. The NIH must be above
both politics and political correctness." Stephen Burd, Key Legislationfor NIHApproaches Enactment
in Congress; Scientists Relieved, but Controversy over AIDS Goes On, CHRON. HIGHER ED., June 2,
1993, at A19, A20 (quoting Thomas J. Bliley, Jr., R-Va.).
For further critical discussion of the effects of political pressures on AIDS research, see Marcia
Angell, A Dual Approach to the AIDSEpidemic, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1498 (1991); Ronald Bayer,
Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to HIVExceptionalism?, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1500 (1991).
80. See Robert E. Quinn & John Rohrbaugh, A Spatial Model of Effectiveness Criteria: Towards
a Competing Values Approach to Organizational Analysis, 29 MGMT. Sci. 363 (1983).
81. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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II. THE IMPACT OF COMPETITION, COORDINATION,
AND COLLABORATION ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
We cannot deduce from the achievements of the Manhattan Project that the
creation of a similar project is the ideal policy approach to AIDS research.
Because the Manhattan Project was a single and distinctive nonexperimental
phenomenon, the ability to make inferences from its experience is severely
constrained. The hypothesis that governmentally centralized research is the
most effective policy is an important one, yet we must be careful not to
embrace a Manhattan Project II approach without giving serious consideration
to the likely effects of such an endeavor on the competitive and cooperative
forces that shape innovation.
This Part examines the possible impact of unrestrained research coordination
on scientific innovation, focusing on the adversarial nature of scientific
breakthroughs, the effects of bureaucratization on research, and the role of
competitive forces in the advancement of science.
A. The Adversarial Nature of Scientific Breakthroughs
The creation of new knowledge is a product of contentiousness within
scientific communities."2 As a result, short-term research efficiency,
particularly when gained as a product of coordinated programming, may
conflict with long-term research effectiveness.
In his classic examination of the nature of scientific progress, Thomas Kuhn
explains the development of revolutionary models that supplant and improve
upon prior research paradigms.83 Kuhn observes the tendency in scientific
communities to suppress novel approaches that are subversive to received
models.8 4 Scientific progress is therefore an inherently revolutionary process,
in which the forces of scientific inertia are transcended, and the paradigms for
understanding a particular research problem are transformed. 8
The existence of received paradigms is vital to the advancement of science.
The acceptance of given models and assumptions allows scientists to build on
another's existing findings without repeating accepted foundational re-
search.86 Yet, paradigmatic science can also breed myopia, as investigators
schooled in a specific approach view their research questions with "drastically
restricted vision," evincing intolerance for new theories and paradigms that
diverge from the traditional models in which they have been trained.8
While some constraint upon vision, consistent with the findings and widely
held beliefs of others, encourages the efficient progress of stepwise research,
it may be harmful to long-term research effectiveness. Because "[d]iscovery
82. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
83. THoMAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCiENTiFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
84. Id. at 5.
85. Id. at 6-7.
86. Id. at 19.
87. Id. at 24.
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commences with the awareness of anomaly,""8 the quest to find more
effective treatments for AIDS may depend upon the degree to which the
research community remains receptive to innovative but unpopular investiga-
tive streams.8 9
For example, Dr. Jonas Salk currently is engaged in controversial AIDS
research" that bears remarkable similarity to the research that resulted in the
polio vaccine decades ago: once again, he is pursuing an investigative vein
largely ignored or discredited by others. 9' As Salk's iconoclastic theories led
to the end of the polio epidemic, so the vaccination or cure for AIDS will
come from the vision of someone who sees the problem somewhat differently
from the masses of investigators. The end of AIDS will likely accompany a
demonstration that the scientists who came before missed something essential,
or modeled the disease inaccurately, due to some largely accepted but false
paradigm.
Salk's controversial approach to AIDS research is not the only unpopular
model that probably would be harmed by highly centralized orchestration. A
minority of controversial scientists contend that HIV is not the sole cause of
the onset of AIDS, suggesting the existence of some co-factor to explain
disparities in the experiences of persons diagnosed as HIV positive. 92
Because they are outside the mainstream of received AIDS research,
proponents of co-factor theories have experienced difficulty in receiving
funding to examine their hypotheses-even under our currently restrained
form of government coordination.93 While co-factor theorists face impedi-
ments to doing contrarian research in a relatively unfettered marketplace of
ideas, their work remains feasible in part because such alternative perspectives
have not been marginalized out of existence by rigid centralization.
Like Salk's current work, the co-factor theory of AIDS may eventually win
more converts, or it may prove to be as fruitless as the majority of investiga-
tors currently contend. The ultimate fate of these particular approaches, or of
any other controversial approach, is not the issue here. Rather, the critical
88. Id. at 52.
89. In this vein, Dr. Anthony Fauci has observed, "To completely Manhattanize [AIDS research]
would take away from the creativity." Garrett, supra note 23, at 4.
90. Salk's work on an AIDS vaccine met with much skepticism at the most recent international
meeting on AIDS. Sheryl Stolberg, Salk Report on AIDS Vaccine Meets Skepticism at Convention, L.A.
TiMES, June 10, 1993, at A7.
91. For discussion of the Salk AIDS vaccine, "Salk Immunogen," and the similarity between his
discredited approaches to polio and AIDS, see Sheryl Stolberg, Hero with Something to Prove, L.A.
TIMEs, Mar. 7, 1993, at At.
92. For discussion of this theory, see ROBERT S. ROOT-BERNSTEIN, RETHINKING AIDS: THE TRAGIc
COST OF PREMATURE CONSENSUS 327-49 (1993).
Some have gone beyond the co-factor theory to suggest that HIV does not cause AIDS at all. See,
e.g., William Booth, A Rebel Without a Cause of AIDS, 239 Sci. 1485 (1988) (discussing the
iconoclastic viewpoints of U.C. Berkeley biologist Peter Duesberg, who contests the HIV theory of
AIDS) [hereinafter Booth, A Rebel]. Duesberg has posited that AIDS is caused by recreational and anti-
HIV drugs. Peter H. Duesberg, The Role of Drugs in the Origin ofAIDS, 46 BIOMED & PHARMACOTHE-
RAPIE 3 (1992).
93. Barbara O'Bnen, Scientist Points to Alternative in AIDS Research, BUFFALO NEws, Apr. 28,
1993, at 6.
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point is to ensure a diversity of scientific approaches, including acceptance of
unpopular models espoused by otherwise highly qualified and esteemed
scholars.
Specifically, we must eschew regulatory policies that may inadvertently
result in administrative imperialism. If pluralism and tolerance are essential
elements of scientific advancement, the government faces a difficult challenge
in developing an optimal AIDS research policy. It must maintain standards to
ensure that the research being funded is not spurious while remaining
receptive to novel approaches that are unpopular or threatening to a
community of scientists who have vested interests in their own potentially
flawed paradigms.
The granting of extraordinary government powers, such as the implementa-
tion of a unified research program directed by an AIDS Czar, would be a
policy dangerous in its extremity Potential harm lies in the centralization of
decision-making power and the damage to science associated with limitations
of vision, diversity of perspectives, and objectivity 9"
The vesting of extreme powers in an AIDS Czar may eliminate some
replication and disqualify ostensibly ill-conceived projects. It may also have
an intolerable chilling effect on eccentricity, the twisted vision essential to the
shifting of paradigms in the scientific and medical communities. We currently
lack effective treatments for AIDS because of false assumptions and blind
spots in the received scientific models. The discovery of better treatments will
depend upon activities that are subversive to the limits of extant understand-
ings. Subversive research activity can thrive, but only if the mechanisms for
funding and resource allocation remain reasonably open to a diversity of
perspectives. This essential element of diversity would be discouraged by
highly centralized coordination of AIDS research through federal administra-
tive control over laboratory activities.95
B. The Impact of Centralized Policy on Bureaucratization of
Research, and Concomitant Losses in Efficiency and
Effectiveness
Government regulation of private enterprise, and government management
of public and quasi-public organizations, have long been associated with
94. The potentially negative impact of centralized research policy on scientific advances is a
function of the relationship between innovation and autonomy. For discussion of the superiority of
autonomous behavior over induced behavior in high value-added, high innovation activities, see Steven
R. Salbu & Richard A. Brahm, Planning Versus Contracting for International Joint Venture Success:
The Case for Replacing Contract with Strategy, 31 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283 (1993).
95. The free market approach to science, in contrast to extreme centralized regulatory control, is
relatively open-textured, providing for the free flow of.information, as well as the freedom to pursue
alien or unpopular avenues of thought. For discussion of the value of "free access" to information and
data developed among competing labs, and its role in facilitating challenges to extant paradigms, see
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1053-55 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Patents].
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inefficiencies and costs related to the cumbersome nature of bureaucracy 96
Some scientists believe that centralized planning of AIDS research may result
in bureaucratic delays.9 7 Both relatively unintrusive centralization, such as
strategic planning of resource allocation, and relatively intrusive centraliza-
tion, such as a Manhattan Project II, could subject projects to bureaucratic
inefficiency and delay
Moreover, bureaucracy is likely to subvert organizational adaptation by
emphasizing control over autonomy of personnel.9" Bureaucracy demands
compliance with rules and regulations, behavior that is predictable and
dependable, and internalization of organizational values.99 These bureaucratic
characteristics are incompatible with the processes of intellectual exploration
and scientific discovery
Unnecessary layers of bureaucracy, imposed on the decision-making
processes of ordinarily independent labs, may also impede institutional
learning. Argyris and Schon have distinguished "single-loop" and "double-
loop" learning in organizations: single-loop learning consists of adjusting
results of activity to pre-established standards, while double-loop learning
entails periodical or ongoing reassessment of, and modification of, the
standards themselves.'
Double-loop learning is a desirable attribute of laboratory research because
it allows investigation to build on itself, incorporating information and
adjusting goals and programs accordingly 10 These adjustments, which steer
the direction of work in progress, are incompatible with bureaucratic control.
While double-loop learning pervades the entire life of the institution or
organization as it unfolds from one moment to the next, bureaucratic standards
and instructions are hierarchical and detached from daily operations. As a
96. For discussion of the inefficiencies associated with regulatory bureaucracy, see generally
CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977). For discussion of the negative
effects of NIH bureaucracy on laboratory research, see Larry Thompson, NIH at 100: Where Big
Government Meets Big Science, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1987, at Z12.
97. See supra note 50.
98. See JEFFREY PFEFFER, ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 166 (1982) (discussing
the tendency of bureaucratic structures to increase organizational control).
99. Richard C. Edwards, Worker Traits and Organizational Incentives: What Makes a "Good"
Worker?, I1 J. HUM. RES. 51 (1976).
100. CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD A. SCHON, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: A THEORY OF ACTION
PERSPECTIVE (1978).
101. See Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, I MINERVA
55 (1962). In his principle of "spontaneous coordination of independent initiatives," Polanyi expresses
the particular role of feedback loops in the learning process of research labs. He suggests that unfettered,
unmanaged scientific research will be naturally coordinated by an invisible hand, which consists in part
of the continual flow of information and a resulting refinement of research topics and experimental
design. Accordingly, "a series of independent initiatives are organised to a joint achievement by
mutually adjusting themselves at every successive stage to the situation created by all the others who
are acting likewise." Id.
Performance is optimized through stepwise advancement of cooperation, decentralized so that the
most competent decsion-maker can incorporate the latest, most relevant information with maximum
efficiency and effectiveness. Because double-loop learning relies on constant and immediate
incorporation of feedback in an ongoing process of investigation, it is naturally best suited to
decentralized environments, allowing those working most intimately with the kpowledge and information
to make expedient, well-informed adjustments.
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result, bureaucratic authority over R&D is likely to be unresponsive and
rigid-resistant to frequent and rational adjustment of goals and stan-
dards. 2
The bill recently approved by the House and Senate, requiring resource
allocation to be approved by the Director of the Office of AIDS Research,0 3
adds a layer of potential bureaucratic delay in funds allocation. A Manhattan
Project II would be subject to innumerable other sources of delay, as
previously autonomous lab decisions would fall under the fiat of governmental
authority and approval procedures. As Manhattan Project scientists became
frustrated with the red tape accompanying military control," 4 so AIDS
researchers would face potential areas of conflict with administrators, the
resolution of which would require time-consuming negotiation activity that
simply does not exist in regard to unilateral decision-making.
1 0 5
While both moderate and extreme proposals for government coordination of
AIDS research would be subject to potential bureaucratic inefficiencies, 0 6
less extreme recommendations such as centralized strategic planning of
resource allocation have countervailing benefits that would probably more
than compensate for bureaucratic impediments. 07 Moreover, my forthcom-
ing proposals for limited centralization are tempered by provisions aimed at
reducing prospective inefficiencies.
1 0 8
C. The Role of Competitive Forces in the Advancement of Science
Unfortunately, the more extreme proposals favoring administrative
usurpation of public and private research activity would have side effects
apart from bureaucratic sluggishness. They would also undermine the basic
incentives and values that form the foundation of normal science. Although
cooperation is obviously a source of information dispersion as well as
production synergies, the optimal role of cooperation in scientific research is
as a competitive tool.'0 9 While cooperation is important to the rapid
102. Scholars have observed that double-loop learning is difficult to sustain, and requires substantial
institutional support. See, e.g., James G. March, Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational
Learning, 2 ORG. Sci. 71 (1991); Danny Miller & Peter H. Friesen, Momentum and Revolution in
OrganizationalAdaptation, 23 ACAD. MGMT. J. 591 (1980). As a result, centralization of AIDS research
policy that is overly intrusive and overly bureaucratic may impede laboratory learnng by rendering
feedback and reassessment processes overly cumbersome, or even impossible, given regulatory
requirements such as top-down approval or authorization of change.
103. See supra note 30.
104. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
105. Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 95.
106. See Philip H. Abelson, Federal Impediments to Scientific Research, 251 Sc. 605 (1991)
(describing how laws and regulations monitoring use of public funds have diverted scientific talent from
research to bureaucratic and regulatory compliance work, essentially turning scientists into administra-
tors).
107. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
109. See ROBERT K. MERTON, Behavior Patterns of Scientists, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCiENCE:
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 325, 339 (1973) (referring to science as "institutional-
ized vigilance, involving competitive cooperation.").
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development of scientific theory, it should be subsumed within, and subverted
to, the dominant and driving force of competition.
Competition is vital to scientific advancement because of the role it plays
in inducing effort, innovation, investment, and creativity, both in the public
and the private research sectors. In NIH and university facilities, highly
motivated scholars are driven to compete against one another for a sense of
accomplishment, academic prestige, and potentially lucrative private
consulting opportunities that come with academic achievement." ° The
famous DNA race between James Watson and Linus Pauling exemplifies the
relationship between scientific advances and high stakes, ambition, drive, and
competition."' In the private sector, more purely commercial incentives, too
often disparaged by activists, account for the rapid rate of innovation in
biotechnological applications today 12
Competition should be valued more highly than cooperation in research
policy because, while competitive dynamics will ensure the occurrence of
cooperative behaviors, mandatory cooperation will not in itself induce
competition or the incentives inherent therein.' Competition naturally
begets cooperation, to the extent that alliance activity confers competitive
advantage over those who attempt to work in isolation." 4 As long as
collaboration provides value to those who engage in it, competitors will
recognize the need to collaborate and arrange strategic alliances accordingly
The market, driven by the competitive activity of self-seeking investigators,
will monitor itself in regard to optimal collaborative opportunities. For these
reasons, we should restrict government compulsion of R&D collaboration."'
110. For discussion of the incentives that drive scientific research, see MARLAN GLISSET, POLITICS
IN SCIENCE (1972); JAMES D. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1981).
The incentives that drive scientists are controversial, however, and critics have suggested that the
commercialization of research is creating conflicts of interests that may jeopardize the purity ofresearch.
See, e.g., Warren E. Leary, Business and Scholarship; A New Ethical Quandary, N.Y. TiMES, June 12,
1989, at Al.
111. W. Henry Lambright & Albert H. Teich, The Organizational Context of Scientific Research, in
2 HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 305, 307 (Paul C. Nystrom & William H. Starbuck eds.,
1981).
112. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 178 (1987) ("The commercial potential of recent advances in biotechnolo-
gy has substantially increased private investment in basic research in the biomedical sciences.').
113. For an excellent discussion of the manner in which open competition will naturally and
optimally allocate cooperative efforts among competitors, see Polanyl, supra note 101.
114. See James R. Golden, Economi6s and National Strategy: Convergence, Global Networks, and
Cooperative Competition, 16 WASH. Q., Summer 1993, at 88, 91 ("Corporate strategy now requires
cooperative competition, a framework that simultaneously enhances mutual performance and shapes the
form of competition. In this sense, cooperation and competition are not alternative approaches to
relationships. The cooperative component enhances the competition by making both parties more
effective, and at the same time the structure of cooperation limits the scope of acceptable competition.").
115. A counter-argument might be made as follows: while competition begets some cooperation, for
example, self-serving forms of cooperation, it also begets secrecy and furtiveness, qualities that impede
the progress of scientific research.
There is no doubt that competition can yield some dysfunctional side effects. The well-publicized
battle between Robert Gallo and Luc Montagnier over credit for identifying the AIDS virus is an
example, wherein two scientists with a history of data sharing became secretive and adversarial. David
Remick, Robert Gallo Goes to War, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1987, (Magazine), at WIO.
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III. STRATEGIC PLANNING: A PROPOSAL FOR
RESTRAINED GOVERNMENT COORDINATION OF AIDS RESEARCH
A. The Value of Restrained Government Coordination
Although oversimplified, the ideals of centrally managed AIDS research are
not entirely invalid. They reflect a legitimate perception of the need for public
policy to promote the quick dispersion of information, the sharing of research
findings, and the effective choice of research questions so as to avoid
unnecessary redundancy
My criticism of a centralized research policy has focused on the loss of
adversarialism and private research incentives, 16 as well as the financial
and temporal costs associated with bureaucratization.1 7 Perhaps most
importantly, the bureaucratization of research into a centralized approach to
AIDS investigations is likely to lead to institutionalized myopia: the very
notion of a single, approved research policy forecloses the possibility of
innovative, paradigm-breaking research."'8 While there are undeniable
benefits to be gained from encouraging collaboration, the policy should gain
such benefits in a manner that preserves the stimuli and the fluidity of private
enterprise.
Various proposals for the centralization of AIDS research would be
accompanied by different levels of intrusiveness into laboratory autonomy
Martin Delaney, of Project Inform in San Francisco, has recommended
creating a blue-ribbon panel to assess proposed research programs quick-
ly 119 Delaney's proposal also includes a well-funded Manhattan Project, tax
and patent benefits for commercial collaborators, and streamlined Food and
Drug Administration review through a review team dedicated to the pro-
ject. 20 A more intrusive set of recommendations, entitled the "Barbara
McClintock Project to Cure AIDS," comes from ACT UP/New York.' 2' The
McClintock Project entails the granting of "extraordinary powers," such as the
right to use all facilities or staff that have been funded by the government, the
right to test possible cures when companies are dilatory in doing so, and the
right to access alr relevant data from public or private companies engaged in
Projects rendered competitive by virtue of high stakes, whether in science or in industry, will
inevitably result in both normal and excessive furtiveness and combativeness. Yet, I stand by my
assertion that cooperation should be subsumed within competition. A lack of competitive incentives
would do worse than create isolated pockets of dysfunction-it would drive research to a halt, removing
the excitement and undermining the entire game. Inevitably, competitive dynamics have allowed
capitalist economies to dominate technological innovation across the world, while planned, communist
economies lagged decades behind. The competitive impetus to innovation, albeit somewhat marred by
overzealous rivalry, is still the preeminent path to high-technology breakthroughs.
116. See supra notes 82-95, 109-18 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
118. Id.
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AIDS research. 2 While the McClintock Project might expedite a limited
number of short-term research transactions, it would also reduce private
incentives to pursue AIDS projects. Moreover, the public usurpation and
unification of research activities would tend to impair the full force of the
"patent race" that is encouraged by atomistic and natural competition among
numerous decentralized and autonomous labs.
2 3
The exigency of AIDS might justify the sacrifice of private interests for the
benefit of an immediate cure, if such a cure were imminent. Most experts
concede, however, that no immediate cure is in sight. 2 4 The search for an
effective AIDS treatment is probably a long-term project, which will rely on
building a foundation of basic research-a foundation that is likely to take
years to achieve. 2 5 Consequently, the preservation of private rights in AIDS
research is not simply a greedy exchange of lives for money Rather, it
reflects a continued faith in private incentives as the most effective and
efficient medium for long-term technological progress.
For these reasons, as well as those discussed in the previous Part, a
Manhattan Project for AIDS cannot be justified. The bureaucratic collection
of star scholars, management of their research, and control over the flow of
information are all ultimately inefficient. Because the efficacy of managed
research under the Manhattan Project is speculative, 2 6 and because a
Manhattan Project II would take a heavy toll on research autonomy and
incentives,2 7 the proposal in this Part is less drastic. It reflects an effort to
balance the virtues of competition and cooperation with an eye towards
encouraging voluntary collaboration in lieu of exacting mandatory coopera-
tion.
B. Improved Government Coordination Through Enhanced
Strategic Planning and Organization of
Grant Review and Approval Processes
This proposal recognizes that the existing system of government funding is
a potentially potent tool for improving the- cohesiveness of otherwise insular
AIDS research projects. My recommendation supports the development of a
strategic plan for AIDS research. Consistency and fit with the plan are
122. Id.
123. For discussion of patent race effects, see Alden F. Abbott, Joint Production Ventures: The Case
for Antitrust Reform, 58 ANTrrRusT L.. 715, 719-22 (1989).
124. Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor's World: Conference Ends with Little Hope for AIDS Cure,
N.Y. TiMES, June 15, 1993, at CI ("Only an eternal optimist would have left the ninth international
AIDS meeting last week believing that new drugs will be available anytime soon to save the lives
of the 14 million people now infected with the virus that causes AIDS.").
125. Virologists Lawrence Corey and William Haseltine suggest that, at the present stage of
understanding, it is crucial to attract more investigators to basic research. A cure and a vaccine for AIDS
will require a better knowledge base than currently exists. Cohen, A Manhattan Project, supra note 48,
at 1113.
126. See supra notes 51-81 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
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legitimate factors in determining which grant proposals should be funded. 28
The proposition is controversial to the extent that a preordained strategic plan
may be viewed as having the potential to chill academic freedom and to
inhibit projects that are counterintuitive, contiarian, or paradigm shifters.129
These potentially negative effects of strategic planning are significant, given
the essentially revolutionary nature of scientific advancement.
At the extreme, some purists suggest that science should be motivated solely
by the search for truth. 3 According to this philosophy, social ends should
never be the criteria that drive science, because the influence of social
problems on a scientist's framing of her research undermines "the purity of
the developing body of knowledge.''
Notwithstanding the real possibility that a strategic plan may stifle some
innovative research proposals and influence the otherwise naturally unfolding
direction of scientific investigation, planning is a viable means of improving
the efficiency and comprehensiveness of AIDS research. With or without a
strategic plan, funding decisions must ultimately be made based on assess-
ments of relative merit, 2 and such decisions will always be subject to the
biases and beliefs of decision-makers. Given that allocation of scarce
resources requires some form of evaluation,' it is appropriate as well as
inevitable that grant committees try to estimate the chances that AIDS
128. The use of strategic planning to balance the goals of scientific cohesiveness and autonomy dates
to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, under which the system of"admmistrative contracts" was developed.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1819 (1992).
The system essentially uses contract granting standards as a front-end mechanism for quality control,
but then allows for scientific autonomy and flexibility by decentralizing project management and
limiting administrative review procedures.
For discussion of the reasons that this limited method of governmental control is preferable to more
pervasive and centralized governmental authority over laboratory work, see Crease & Samios, supra note
49, at 86-88.
129. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 95, at 1060.
The independence of scientists in the day to day conduct of research promotes progress by
enabling scientists to exploit their expertise fully and to make use of new information as they
acquire it in the course of their investigations, without needing to comply with instructions or
justify their activities to supervisors. Coordination or central planning of research
substitutes the judgment of the research coordinator for that of the individuals who are actually
immersed in the details of the research.
Id. (citation omitted).
130. For a good explication of this purist view, see GEORGE H. DANIELS, SCIENCE IN SOCIETY: A
SOCIAL HISTORY 288-95 (1971).
131. Id. at 288.
132. The Division of Research Grants of the NIH is guided by an elaborate set of acts and
regulations regarding grants policy and grant applications review. For an historical summary, see NIH
ALMANAC 1992, NIH Pub. No. 92-5, Nov. 1992, at 102-04.
133. For NIH evaluation criteria, see APPLICATION KIT, NATIONAL INsTrrUTEs OF HEALTH
RESEARCH GRANTS, PHS 398.
Much has been written on the process of grant application evaluation by the NIH. See, e.g., Janet M.
Cuca, NIH Grant Applications for Clinical Research: Reasons for Poor Ratings or Disapproval, 31
CLN. RES. 453 (1983); Janet M. Cuca, Why Clinical Research Grant Applications Fare Poorly in
Review and How to Recover, 5 CANCER INVESTIGATION 55 (1987); George N. Eaves, The Project-Grant
Application of the National Institutes of Health, 32 FED. PROCEEDINGS 1541 (1973); Dons H. Merritt
& George N. Eaves, Site Visitsfor the Review of Grant Applications to the National Institutes of Health,
34 FED. PROC. 131 (1975); Antonia C. Novello, The Peer Review Process: How to Prepare Research
Grant Applications to the NIH, 11 J. MINERAL ELECTROLYTE METABOLISM 282 (1985).
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research will add to the knowledge base.'34 A carefully considered plan,
with guidelines requiring decision-makers to abide by its terms in allocating
resources, has the potential to curb the influence of capriciousness or political
bias and to reinforce the rationality of decision factors. While the possibility
of imperfect decision-making is an inevitable component of selective and
competitive funding, a planning structure is likely to act as a check on, rather
than as a source of, poor decisions.'35
Moreover, the dangers of chilling creativity and innovation by funding only
projects that fit the strategy can be minimized by buffering policies.
Accordingly, my proposal for centralized strategic planning of AIDS research
includes the following safeguards, designed to reduce unnecessary redundan-
cies, increase symbiotic interaction, and ameliorate the propensity of a plan
to chill innovation:
(1) Both the strategic plan and funding decisions in compliance with the
strategic plan should be made by a pluralistic committee representing various
perspectives and schools of theory Under both current governmental funding
processes and my proposed plan for enhanced strategic coordination,
judgments regarding the comparative value of proposed projects are
unavoidable, and indeed desirable. Given limited resources to be distributed
among competing proposals, it is appropriate and necessary to engage in
relative evaluation processes.
3 6
If limited government funds are to be used wisely, it is essential that the
group or committee passing judgment on proposals be impeccably qualified
to compare their relative merits.3 7 The necessity of maintaining a top
quality administrative board will tend to become subject, unfortunately, to a
variety of political dynamics. "38 Power bases, among whom the responsibili-
ty of choosing board representation is lodged, may be inclined to favor either
liberally or conservatively oriented committee members, or to give preference
134. President Kennedy aptly summarized the balance between academic freedom and public needs
in the funding of scientific research, observing, that "[s]cientists alone can establish the objectives of
their research, but society, in extending support to science, must take account of its own needs."
GREENBERG, supra note 68, at 288 (quoting President John F. Kennedy's address to the National
Academy of Science).
135. Although the tendency of scholars to favor conventional research may chill creativity, it will
also serve to weed out projects that are poorly conceived or designed, as well as projects that are clearly
unworkable, according to well-documented scientific tenets. If standards must and should be applied in
evaluating prospective AIDS research projects, it is better to have intelligently organized and evaluated
standards established under a strategic plan than haphazard and ill-considered standards.
136. As Professor Harold P. Green aptly observes, "[N]o scientist is entitled to a research grant
except in the nonarbitraiy, noncapricious, nondiscriminatory discretion of the granting agency." Harold
P. Green, The Law-Science Interface in Public Policy Decisionmalang, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 375, 378
(1990).
137. Qualification to engage in political planning regarding scientific policy should, but too often
does not, require a high degree of scientific literacy. For a discussion of dangers related to scientific
policies created by those who are scientifically ignorant, see Maxine F. Singer, Genetics and the Law:
A Scientist's View, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 315 (1985).
138. See Pear, supra note 14, at 3 ("In practice, the allocation of money [in the course of the federal
process of peer review of grants applications] reflects the political strengths of various lobbies
including women's groups and gay rights advocates.").
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to members with either traditional or nontraditional approaches to science. 39
These tendencies will occur naturally, as part of a general inclination among
power coalitions to enhance their control by stacking decision-making units
with sympathetic representatives. 4
If government authority over funding allocation is to be strengthened in
order to improve the use of resources, it is imperative to establish safeguards
to mitigate the likelihood that strategic consistency will deteriorate into
scientific or ideological parochialism. The best defense in this regard rests in
the composition of the body charged with establishing the strategic plan and
distributing funds thereunder. The political dynamic that favors committee
stacking by existing power bases must be countered, so that the decision-
making board is comprised of members with both uniformly impeccable
qualifications and ideological diversity 14
By couching funding decisions within a board comprised of expert members
of heterogeneous perspectives, the balance can be maintained between
ensuring quality research and protecting against prohibitively restrictive
research models. A board comprised of widely varying perspectives is most
likely to include vocal advocates of controversial but promising research
efforts, assuring that potentially ground-breaking or paradigm-shifting research
proposals will receive a fair hearing. 4 2
(2) The strategic plan should include a baseline percentage of projects
designated as controversial. These projects would be considered in a separate
category into which they would be submitted by their sponsors. In other
words, if the plan required that ten percent of total funding go to projects
labeled controversial, these dollars would be awarded to projects chosen from
a separate pool of entries. Scientists would channel controversial entries into
the pool by their own choice, and the committee evaluating grant proposals
would be charged with the duty to award ten percent of total funding to the
projects from the controversial pool deemed most meritorious.'43
139. For a good discussion of the political dynamics that affect decision-making within federal
agencies, see James E. Katz, Science, Technology, and Congress, SOcIETY, May-June 1993, at 41, 43-
48.
140. For a classic discussion of the dynamics of power coalitions in organizational processes, see
Gerald R. Salancik & Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Bases and Use of Power in Organizational Decision Making:
The Case of a University, 19 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 453 (1974).
141. There are several ways to achieve heterogeneity of committee membership, all of which
ultimately rest on our ability to remove personnel decisions, and thereby remove funding decisions, from
the political process. The most obvious classification of these mechanisms distinguishes voluntary and
regulatory Impetuses to diversity. Either executive appointments to the committee charged with oversight
of AIDS grant applications must exhibit political restraint and sensitivity to the need to de-politicize
membership, or else regulatory edict must mandate bi-partisan or other heterogeneous division of
appointment power.
142. Group diversity has been shown to encourage creative outcomes. See, e.g., Nigel King & Neil
Anderson, Innovation in Working Groups, in INNOVATION AND CREATIVITY AT WORK 81 (Michael A.
West & James L. Farr eds., 1990); T.H. Thornburg, Group Size and Member Diversity Influence on
Creative Performance, 25 J. CREATIVe BEHAv. 324 (1991). Diversity among decision-makers who
control allocation of grant funds can therefore be expected to enhance the likelihood of creativity and
openness to creativity in the distribution of research moneys.
143. The ten percent figure chosen here is arbitrary, reflecting the importance of balancing the
efficiency of intelligent prejudices against their chilling effect upon innovation. The figure is kept as a
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Of course, the creation of a designated pool of controversial projects cannot
ensure that any funding committee will review the applications objective-
ly-without undue prejudice associated with received models and schools of
belief. The creation of a controversial pool can, however, charge the
committee with a good faith responsibility to assess at least a portion of the
proposed projects with open minds. It would also force the committee to fund
a minimum number of maverick studies, regardless of their beliefs and
prejudices, thereby protecting the viability of the most meritorious controver-
sial projects.
(3) The strategic plan should be developed and implemented under both top-
down and bottom-up influences. The planning literature recognizes two
prototypical approaches to strategy formulation and implementation: top-down
and bottom-up. Top-down strategies are relatively centralized and authoritari-
an.' Ideas tend to be generated from the highest level of the institution or
organization, reflecting a purported need to incorporate a broad, inclusive
perspective into the planning process. Bottom-up planning attempts to de-
emphasize formal organizational and hierarchical boundaries while encourag-
ing the bubbling up of proposals and ideas from the lower and middle ranks
of the institution. 145
While maximizing resource allocation efficiency requires the application of
the wide, inclusive vision of top-level decision-makers, the norms of science
demand that strategic planning of AIDS research funding incorporate a high
degree of openness and receptivity to proposals from all levels of the
scientific community 146 High level administrators are advantaged by the
scope of their purview, but they are also disadvantaged by the distance at
which they are separated from the ongoing work of AIDS research. The
relatively small percentage, in deference to the high level of expertise among American scientists and
the likelihood that respect for strongly held beliefs and conventions will therefore reduce wasteful
resource allocation.
I also suggest that free market dynamics will control the percentage of submissions that scientists
self-select for consideration as "controversial," provided that feedback regarding submission levels and
acceptance rates is made public information. This assertion is based on an assumption that a history of
over-submission will reduce future submissions in the category, while a history of under-submission will
increase future submissions in the category.
144. Entirely top-down strategy formulation has been largely discredited for being unresponsive,
unadaptive, and detached from nuts-and-bolts inputs of those who will ultimately be responsible for
implementing the strategy. Accordingly, while formal strategic planning models tend to emphasize top-
down planning direction, they virtually always include feedback and control mechanisms for the
incorporation of information that can "bubble up" from all ranks. See, e.g., BALAJI S. CHAKRAVARTHY
& PETER LORANGE, MANAGING THE STRATEGY PROCESS 7 (1991) (proposing an essentially top-down
planning process that allows for formal and informal interaction across all levels that will eventually be
involved in strategic implementation).
145. Bottom-up strategies are often associated with McGregor's "Theory Y" philosophy of human
nature, which emphasizes self-direction and self-control, and the dispersion of responsibility and
creativity across all levels of bureaucracy, resulting in greater commitment to institutional objectives and
enterprises. For a discussion of Theory Y, see DOUGLAS MCGREGOR, THE HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE
(1960). For a discussion of the compatibility between Theory Y and bottom-up strategic formulation,
see JAMES B. QUINN, STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE: LOGICAL INCREMENTALISM 86 (1980).
146. For a discussion of the relationship between organic organizational structures and innovation,
see TOM BURNS & GEORGE M. STALKER, THE MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATION (1966).
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insights that are gained daily by lab workers at every level will not naturally
reveal themselves in the midst of government bureaucracy Because organiza-
tional dynamics, such as hierarchical norms of authority and complexity of
communications channels, reduce the likelihood that important information
will move upward and reach strategic decision-makers, 147 the planning
process must be built to fight inertia and encourage the surfacing of ideas.'
4
The facilitation of bottom-up communication and generation of ideas is
particularly crucial whenever any recommendation to increase governmental
decision-making roles is adopted. The most radical cost of centralized
decision-making, even at the limited level of project funding, consists of the
loss of open-market information flows and resulting heterogeneous inputs.
149
To offset this loss, the planning process should be built with an eye towards
opening communications and increasing fluidity of information.'
Specifically, the process should vest ultimate decision-making authority in
the control of top-level administrators, but should delegate to middle-level
administrators responsibility for generating proposals regarding funding
priority guidelines. By shifting strategic planning proposal development from
the top to the middle levels of the NIH or other appropriate governmental
body, two crucial benefits are likely to result: (1) Decentralization will allow
greater numbers of middle-level administrators to sift through a large amount
of information; and (2) Decentralization will facilitate the effective movement
of information from the labs themselves into the strategy formulation and
implementation processes.
The middle-level administrators responsible for generating ideas should be
expected to maintain open communications with the scientific AIDS
community They should be sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the
nature of the research. Most importantly, administrators responsible for
generating strategic funding prionties should be expected to begin the
conversation with the scientific community They must communicate their
receptiveness to, and establish channels for, informational inputs. 15' This
147. Goal announcement from loci of authority results in centralization of organization. Centralization
creates an implicit understanding that (i) tangential or outside issues remain closed for consideration,
and (ii) the ideas of subordinates regarding decision-making alternatives are irrelevant. The benefit of
various perspectives, culled from widespread inputs by those having intimate knowledge in relevant
areas, is therefore lost in overly authoritarian processes. QUINN, supra note 145, at 67.
148. See Henry Mintzberg, The Innovative Organtzation, in HENRY MINTZBERG & JAMES B. QUINN,
THE STRATEGY PROCESS 731, 742-43 (1991) (observing that strategies "grow initially like weeds in a
garden," and that "to manage this process is not to preconceive strategies but to recognize their
emergence and intervene when appropnate).
149. See HENRY MINTZBERG, THE STRUCTURING OF ORGANIZATIONS: A SYNTHESIS OF THE
RESEARCH 432-33 (1979) ("To innovate means to break away from established patterns. So the
innovative organization cannot rely on any form of standardization for coordination. In other words, it
must avoid all the trappings of bureaucratic structure.").
150. For an excellent discussion of some dysflunctions of formal communications processes and the
value of encouraging informal channels of communication, see EDWIN A. GERLOFF, ORGANIZATION
THEORY AND DESIGN 281-300 (1985).
151. For discussion of the importance of including inputs from the scientific community into the
establishment of AIDS and other research priorities, see Daniel E. Koshland, Jr., Basic Research (III):
Priorities, 259 SCi. 1379 (1993).
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middle administrative level is an essential mediator between the information
held by the working ranks and the coordinating perspective that ultimately
must be applied by upper level administrators if funding allocations are to be
optimally effective and efficient.
IV THE SUPERIORITY OF VOLUNTARY ALLIANCES
OVER MANDATED ALLIANCES
IN ACHIEVING COOPERATIVE ADVANTAGE
In the proposal just examined, government authority over research is limited
to strategic planning of publicly funded science. More intrusive regulatory
efforts have been rejected as antithetical to the norms and dynamics of
scientific progress. While I have dismissed the prudence of compulsory
collaboration under a Manhattan Project II, we need not therefore lose the
benefits of substantially increased levels of cooperation. The following
analysis suggests that these advantages may be achieved by encouraging
voluntary strategic alliances.
Organizational scholarship over the past decade has recognized the value of
strategic alliance activity in facilitating technological innovation." 2 My
recommendations are intended to capitalize on the innovative potential of
alliances by encouraging free and open collaboration through the use of
innovative organizational systems. Specifically, I emphasize the potential
efficiency and effectiveness benefits to be derived from joint venture 5 3 and
network forms'54 of voluntary collaboration in AIDS research. "5 Joint
ventures and strategic networks can provide many of the advantages sought
by AIDS activists who are currently demanding a federally coordinated AIDS
research program while avoiding many of the shortcomings of government
centralization. Taken together, the benefits discussed in the following
categories have the potential to increase return per dollar spent on AIDS
research and to improve the effectiveness of that research by enhancing the
use of both knowledge and resources.
152. See, e.g., Herminia Ibarra, Network Centrality, Power, and Innovation Involvement:
Determinants of Technical and Administrative Roles, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 471 (1993); Michael L.
Tushman, Special Boundary Roles in the Innovation Process, 22 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 587 (1977).
153. For the purposes of this discussion, I shall define a 'joint venture" as a cooperative association,
between two or more parent firms, in the form of a new jointly owned or jointly managed entity. Whilejoint ventures can serve many potential functions, the emphasis in this Article will be placed on ventures
for R&D collaboration.
154. For purposes of this discussion, I shall define a "strategic network" as a collection or an
organized set of collaborative arrangements, such as joint ventures, co-marketing agreements, consortia,
licensing and cross-licensing arrangements, and minority equity investments.
155. Organizational collaboration can occur at other levels as well; and my focus here on joint
ventures and strategic networks is not meant to foreclose consideration of other options. Bryan Borys
and David B. Jemison have identified five hybrid forms of organization that reflect varying levels of
mutual commitment. From greatest to least commitment, these five forms are mergers, acquisitions, joint
ventures, license agreements, and supplier arrangements. Bryan Borys & David B. Jemison, Hybrid
Arrangements as Strategic Alliances: Theoretical Issues in Organizational Combinations, 14 ACAD.
MGMT. REv. 234, 235 (1989).
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A. Technological Synergy and Technology Diffusion
The pharmaceutical industry already engages in joint ventures to exchange
complementary technologies and patents. 5 6 Parent firms identify promising
partners and negotiate relations with those most likely to provide them with
the missing pieces of the research puzzles they are solving.1 57 Typically, this
entails choosing partners with similar research and development commitments
or with complementary strengths, so the alliance creates a symbiotic
relationship through which each collaborator builds upon the capabilities of
the other.'5 s According to Contractor and Lorange, firms engaged in
technology exchange ventures seek superior products or processes through the
pooling of patents,knowledge, and skills.1 59
Throughout private industry, high technology firms are engaging successful-
ly in strategic alliances in order to share a scarce and expensive resource:
expertise. Companies in high value-added industries recognize the importance
of knowledge linkages in maintaining competitiveness in markets character-
ized by speedy innovation. 6 The ultimate goal of these strategic alliances
is remarkably similar to a fundamental goal of proposed government
centralization and planning of research-to get investigators in labs to talk to
one another and to share important findings and information.
While the conversation among otherwise scattered scientists can be
encouraged either by regulatory compulsion or by voluntary and privately
chosen association, the latter is more likely to result in effective collaboration.
Partners who choose to collaborate consider compatibility factors important
in determining whether to pursue the alliance, including partner rapport, basic
values, belief systems, norms, and trust.'6 ' These sources of rapport are the
underpinnings of group cohesiveness, which has a curvilinear correlation with
group creativity 162
Moreover, assessment of organizational capabilities, a task best accom-
plished by those within the relevant firms who have intimate knowledge of
corporate resources, is a crucial component in the development of successful
alliances.' 63  Like interpersonal relations, corporate capabilities are
156. Farok J. Contractor & Peter Lorange, Why Should Firms Cooperate? The Strategy and
Economics Basis for Cooperative Ventures, in COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BusINESs
3, 13 (Farok J. Contractor & Peter Lorange eds., 1988).
157. Id.
158. Steven R. Salbu & Richard A. Brahm, Strategic Considerations in Designing Joint Venture
Contracts, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 253, 271 [hereinafter Salbu & Brahn, Strategic Considerations).
159. Contractor & Lorange, supra note 156, at 13.
160. For discussion of the role of knowledge linkage m the formation of many lugh-technology
strategic alliances, see JOSEPH BADARACCO, JR., THE KNOWLEDGE LINK: How FiRMs COMP'E
THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCES (1991). For discussion of joint venture activity as a tool for
organizational learning, see Bruce Kogut, Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empircal Perspectives, 9
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 319 (1988).
161. For discussion of these characteristics of successful joint ventures, see Marjorie A. Lyles,
Learning Among Joint Venture Sophisticated Firms, MGMT. INT'L REV. Special Issue 85, 94-95 (1988).
162. HARRY NYSTROM, CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION (1979).
163. BADARACCO, supra note 160, at 131.
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idiosyncratic variables likely to be ignored, or managed poorly, by impersonal
and distant government bureaucracy
In other words, while mandatory research associations based on subject
areas and competencies alone may seem rational at first glance, organizational
dynamics will also be an important factor in determining the ultimate success
of any joint endeavor."' Centralized regulatory agencies are neither
qualified nor equipped to assess the organizational fit of a proposed
arrangement. Conversely, scientists in independent labs are experienced in
assessing the potential for fruitful technological synergy via voluntary project
collaboration. Because independent contracting parties have experience in
assessing relational dynamics, 165 their natural efforts to exploit interactive
research efficiencies are likely to be more successful; on average, than
compulsory relations. Moreover, qualities like enthusiasm, goodwill, and
mutual good faith are more likely to characterize voluntary associations than
compulsory ones.
166
In addition, the optimal conditions for breeding creativity are more
characteristic of voluntary, naturally developed arrangements than of the
mandatory, imposed relationships of a Manhattan Project. These conditions
include democratic and collaborative rather than authoritarian leadership, and
an organizational structure that is organic rather than mechanistic. 167 That
innovation is more likely to arise from spontaneous relations than forced
relations is not surprising, given that the very nature of creativity entails a
departure from, rather than an adherence to, tradition, authority, and order. As
creativity cannot be managed and must be nurtured, so organic and uncoerced
relations are a more propitious source of research innovation than constrained,
obligational organization.
16 1
The crossbreeding that occurs among competitors who form cooperative
alliances for mutual gain also facilitates the general movement of knowledge
and the diffusion of technology 169 From a micro-organizational perspective,
firms sometimes use joint venture and network arrangements to obtain skills
164. See Steven R. Salbu, Joint Venture Contracts as Strategic Tools, 25 IND. L. REv. 397, 424-27
(1991) [hereinafter Salbu, Joint Venture].
165. STEVEN R. SALBU, STRATEGIC IMPACT OF THE JOINT VENTURE CONTRACTING PROCESS (1990)
[hereinafter SALBU, STRATEGIC IMPACT].
166. Satisfaction levels are higher in democratic organizations than m autocratic organizations.
RALPH M. STOGDILL, HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP: A SURVEY OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 370 (1974).
167. Richard W. Woodman et al., Toward a Theory of Organizational Creativity, 18 ACAD. MGMT.
REv. 293, 302 (1993).
168. In this discussion, I mention free and voluntary contracting in comparison with coercion,
suggesting that the former is a more fruitful source of innovation than the latter. In essence, the
argument for minimizing compulsory collaboration and optimizing opportunities for voluntary
collaboration is simply a reassertion of our basic faith in freedom of contract as the optimal vehicle for
providing markets with their needs. For a more elaborate discussion of contract versus coercion, see
Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble with Law-Based Conceptions
of Ethics, 68 IND. L.J. 101 (1992).
169. Joint venture literature often refers to this phenomenon, from the perspective of the firm, as the
risk oftechnology transfer, or the risk ofarming competitors with skills and technologies gained through
the collaborative arrangement. See, e.g., Contractor & Lorange, supra note 156, at 8-9.
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and information. 170 As profit-seeking firms establish voluntary interorgam-
zational linkages in order to receive the technologies necessary to position
themselves in strategically selected industries, there is an inadvertent
effect-the macro-organizational dispersion of technology throughout the
entire industry. 17' The strategic alliance, used by self-seeking companies to
augment their technological positions, is currently an effective tool that
encourages the rapid diffusion of knowledge within the industries in which
they operate. Moreover, even network activity motivated by goals other than
technology transfer will inadvertently facilitate the diffusion of innovation, as
interorganizational channels expedite the flow of information.
1 72
B. Transnational Cooperation
A nationally centralized program of AIDS research would be constrained by
artificial boundaries that are irrelevant to scientific inquiry-the boundaries
of national sovereignty If the Federal Government tries to organize American
laboratory activity, it will be restricted by the limitations of its jurisdiction.
For example, the United States Government cannot compel the best or the
most efficient collaboration if the optimal partnership is between American
and French laboratories. Government's sovereign limitations restrict its efforts
to modulate research activity
The limits of sovereignty do not circumscribe joint venture activity as
constrictively 13 Voluntary transnational alliances can therefore be
developed from the widest possible range of potential research partnerships.
The Federal Government should be reluctant to force a research policy upon
laboratories within its legal reach when the alliances these labs would form
internationally, and of their own accord, might in fact be superior ones. 74
Compulsory collaboration across borders will be inhibited by more than
jurisdictional constraints. Limitations of the U.S. Government's authority to
compel transnational joint ventures exist in two forms: the obvious formal,
legal-jurisdictional limits, and the less obvious informal organizational limits.
Multinational enterprises ("MNE's") are distinctive in their subjection to both
170. C. Christopher Baughn & Richard N. Osborn, The Role of Technology in the Formation and
Form of Multinational Cooperative Arrangements, 1 J. HIGH TECH. MGMT. REs. 181, 182-83 (1990).
171. Id.
172. Howard Aldrich & David A. Whetten, Orgaization-Sets, Action-Sets. and Networks: Making
the Most of Simplicity, in I HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN: VOLUME I ADAPTING
ORGANIZATIONS TO THEIR ENVIRONMENTS 385, 394 (Paul C. Nystrom & William H. Starbuck eds.,
1981).
173. Of course, transnationaljoint venture activity is subject to sovereign limitations of foreign policy
and contract law. These limitations are nowhere near as restrictive as the limits of U.S. Government
jurisdiction, which can only compel research alliances within the United States borders and within
Constitutional bounds. Foreign restrictions on international joint ventures also appear to be declining
as economies are becoming more open. See Salbu, Joint Venture, supra note 164.
174. Implicit here are the notions that optimal research collaboration knows no boundaries and that
scientific investigation is a global enterpnse. The idea that the United States Government can organize
a supenor research agenda domestically fails to recognize the transnational nature of AIDS research
efforts. A policy of nationalized research may reflect an ethnocentric and false presumption that the
United States is the exclusive sphere of biotechnological advancement.
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"multiple sources of external authority" and "multiple denominations of
value,""'t the latter of which confine the receptiveness of MNE's to
centralized forms of control. Even if American regulatory fiat could
completely preside over both parties to transnational alliances, it would have
difficulty doing so due to the complexity of managing cultural and normative
diversity 176 Boilerplate regulatory edict cannot conceivably serve the wide
variety of distinctive challenges that will be created by mapy different but
potentially valuable international matches.'77
Encouragement of the voluntary joint venture has greater potential than
American regulatory fiat for facilitating optimal cooperative behavior. The
joint venture has become a common and popular vehicle for facilitating
transnational initiatives between private companies. 78 International joint
ventures provide a means by which companies can create alliances more
substantial than contractual, arm's length deals, 179 without being deterred by
the excessive risks and commitments inherent in merger or acquisition.' °
In the area of AIDS research, neither market contract nor unity of organiza-
tional hierarchy may provide an adequate mechanism for some companies
considering significant laboratory cooperation. When companies seek to
maintain their distinctive organizational boundaries for most purposes while
attempting to establish high-level commitment to particular team projects
because of potential collaborative synergies or efficiencies, the joint venture
provides opportunities that cannot be achieved by either contracting or
merging. A movement in the law to encourage or even facilitate such
voluntary venture activity should logically increase the incidence of R&D
175. Anant K. Sundaram & J. Stewart Black, The Environment and Internal Organization of
Multinational Enterprises, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 729, 734-39 (1992).
176. For discussion of the cultural constraints on technology transfer across international borders, see
Ben L. Kedia & Rabi S. Bhagat, Cultural Constraints on Transfer of Technology Across Nations:
Implications for Research in International and Comparative Management, 13 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 559
(1988).
177. Steven R. Salbu, Parental Coordination and Conflict in International Joint Ventures: The Use
of Contract to Address Legal, Linguistic, and Cultural Concerns, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1994).
178. For a general discussion of transnational venturing, see KAREN J. HLADiK, INTERNATIONAL
JoiNT VENTURES (1985); Farok J. Contractor, Strategies for Structuring Joint Ventures: A Negotiations
Planning Paradigm, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Summer 1984, at 30; Kenichi Ohmae, The Global Logic
of Strategic Alliances, HARV. BUS. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 143; Robert J. Radway, Overview of
Foreign Joint Ventures, 38 Bus. LAW. 1040 (1983).
179. While joint ventures depart from open market contractual relations between independent firms,
they are nonetheless voluntary and therefore essentially contractual in nature. Whether the coordination
of the relationship between venturing firms takes the form of formal contracting or strategic planning,
the voluntary alliance will be characterized by some governance structure that a bureaucratic entity will
have difficulty reproducing. As a result, control of voluntary joint ventures will tend to be superior to
control of mandatory collaboration. For a detailed discussion of the role of contract and strategy in
coordinating and controlling international ventures, see Salbu & Brahm, Strategic Considerations, supra
note 158.
180. This observation reflects the theory that joint venture activity is a compromise between loose
linkage of firms via market contracting and tight linkage via unification of hierarchical control into one
organizational structure. For discussion of the nature of organizational relationships as a function of
market and hierarchy choices, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYsIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
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cooperation among firms that would otherwise be unable to engage in such
projects. The preference for voluntary alliances, 8 1 including international
ones, is likely to result in the abbreviation of technological development
timeframes. As innovations have been introduced more frequently by firms
outside the United States, product cycles have shrunk because of "global
scanning capabilities" of multinational businesses. 2 By encouraging
privately formed, international alliances rather than requiring alliances that are
restricted by jurisdiction to the domestic realm, we accomplish more than
simply increasing the number of possible collaborative combinations; we also
supports the enlargement of the biotechnological network within which
knowledge scans are likely to occur. By increasing the scope of network
interaction from domestic to international proportions, we facilitate the
worldwide diffusion of technology and increase correspondingly the chances
that the product cycles in AIDS treatments will be shortened. An open market
approach to AIDS R&D allows both public and private facilities to exploit the
development of international networks as a means of expediting technological
innovation.
Joint venture activity has also helped companies to interact with foreign
firms in countries otherwise reluctant to allow American businesses to operate
within their borders. 8 3 Moreover, the reduced entry costs characteristic of
joint venture and network alliances, compared with foreign direct investment,
can encourage international collaboration deemed too politically risky to
justify international merger or acquisition activities. 4
C. Economies of Scale, Rationalization of Research, and
Dilution of Cost and Risk
Both federally mandated collaborative research projects and voluntary
strategic alliances attempt to rationalize research efforts by avoiding
unnecessary duplication of studies and facilities and by achieving potential
scale economies related, for example, to expensive equipment that cannot be
efficiently amortized over the experimentation of a single laboratory. Joint
ventures have long been utilized in a number of industries to exploit the
distinctive cost advantages of each collaborator and to exploit economies
associated with a larger scale than either parent company could achieve
181. This preference is a function, inter alia, of the strategic and financial complexities attendant to
innovation management. For a detailed examination of these complexities, see BRIAN TWIss, MANAGING
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (1974).
182. \Veijian Shan, An Empirical Analysis of Organizational Strategies by Entrepreneurial High-
Technology Firms, 11 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 129, 133 (1990); Raymond Vernon, The Product Cycle
Hypothesis in a New International Environment, in STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPoRATIONs: THE ESSENTIALS 16 (Heidi V Wortzel & Lawrence H. Wortzel eds., 1985).
183. For discussion ofjoint venture activity as a facilitator of foreign market entry and presence, see
James C. Abegglen, U.S. Japan Technological Exchange in Retrospect, 1946-1981, in U.S.-JAPAN
TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE SYMPOSIUM 1 (Cecil H. Uyehara ed., 1982).
184. For discussion of the relationship between political risk of entry and the use of alternatives to
foreign direct investment to mitigate costs associated with such risk, see Ming-Je Tang & Chwo-Ming
Joseph Yu, Foreign Market Entry: Production-Related Strategies, 36 MGMT. SCI. 476, 484-85 (1990).
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individually .85 While either mandatory or optional collaboration has the
potential to achieve these important ends, the latter choice will achieve them
more effectively and with fewer unforeseen costs. The form of any high-
technology linkage should depend in part upon "the conflicting tensions
involved in establishing transactions that are efficient and flexible and are
able to withstand or overcome technological uncertainties."' 8 6 As technologi-
cal intensity increases, rational firms will seek to maintain relatively flexible
commitments in order to respond quickly to unpredictable changes in
assumptions. 8 7 Whereas firms permitted to choose the degree of mutual
commitment ranging from market to hierarchy will maintain control over the
level of resource dedication, firms compelled to engage in particular projects
lose the flexibility and responsiveness that are so valuable in permitting quick
reaction to and assimilation of new information as it emerges continually
during the R&D process.'88 Uncoerced collaboration will tend, therefore, to
maintain a relatively high degree of adaptability, while federally mandated
research interactions will tend to become bureaucratically rigid and en-
trenched. Adaptability allows autonomous entities to modulate idiosyncratical-
ly crafted commitments in order to exploit shifting cost-containment
opportunities. Bureaucratically imbedded mandates to collaborate are simply
too unwieldy and too highly centralized to be adequately responsive or
adaptive to changing conditions.
Voluntary joint venture activity also has the potential to reduce the costs
and risks of any project, thereby increasing the possibility that laboratories
will be willing to take chances on innovative experimentation. Herbert I.
Fusfeld and Carmela S. Haklisch have observed that cooperative groups
generate extraordinarily large research budgets, facilitating projects that may
have been impossible using internally generated financing.8 9 Collective
industrial research at the "precompetitive" stage thus serves some of the
functions advocated by supporters of governmental R&D coordination-most
notably, the provision of a technological base to be shared within the research
185. Farok J. Contractor, Dispersion of Risk Through Multinational Teamwork, MERGERS &
AcQuismoNs, July-Aug. 1987, at 73, 73 [hereinafter Contractor, Dispersion].
186. Baughn & Osbom, supra note 170, at 185.
187. Id. "As the technological intensity of the product of the arrangement increases, firms may be
more likely to opt for market mediated mechanisms (agreements versus joint ventures). When intending
to conduct joint R&D however, firms may opt for the quasi-hierarchy provided by the joint venture."
Id.
An implication is that firms seek the least restrictive viable organizational arrangement under
conditions of uncertainty. This suggests that the bureaucratic intransigence of governmental coordination
of research would be highly ineffective in responding to changes in research assumptions or goals.
188. This assertion is consistent with the recommendation that firms operating under conditions of
uncertainty engage in relatively decentralized governance structures in order to retain strategic flexibility.
Governmentally coordinated programs, being centralized in the extreme, are unlikely to provide
necessary flexibility. For discussion of the value of decentralized governance under conditions of
uncertainty, see Alan D. Meyer, Adapting to Environmental Jolts, 27 ADMiN. Sci. Q. 515 (1982).
189. Herbert I. Fusfeld & Carmela S. Haklisch, Cooperative R&Dfor Competitors: JointActivities
Are Transforming How and Why Companies Undertake Research, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1985,
at 60. The authors cite collaborative research budgets approaching one billion dollars in the mid-1980's.
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community, and cost-sharing and risk-sharing when the resources of individual
companies prove inadequate.
90
While one should not underestimate the value of pooling resources to
achieve otherwise prohibitively expensive, large scale projects, cost-saving
joint venture activity bears another, more indirect advantage-the reduction
of per-project risk to any given firm and the concomitant encouragement of
a wider variety of R&D projects that might otherwise be considered too
marginal to merit investment.' 9' Accordingly, one group of scholars has
observed that "risk reduction or pooling can bring about more innovative
activity than would otherwise be the case. ' 'i 92
Encouraging joint venture activity is likely to reduce another form of
risk-the risk of free ridership by competitors who are able to appropriate
nonproprietary, unpatentable research findings. Scholars have observed that
the prospect of free ridership will tend to inhibit overall levels of R&D
investment, but that collaboration that includes otherwise potential free riders
reduces the problem and encourages private investment. 93 Because AIDS
research is presently stalled at the basic rather than applied stage, both public
and private investigation are more likely to result in unpatentable rather than
patentable findings. 194 As a result, the potential for voluntary alliances to
reduce free ridership and encourage private investment in AIDS research is
likely to be substantial.
While joint venture collaboration aimed at risk reduction and enhanced
creativity and innovation is common among firms engaging in voluntary
alliances, 95 compulsory collaboration is unlikely to have the same effect.
Two dynamics combine to ameliorate potential risk reduction effects within
mandatory alliances.
First, because risk assessment is a partially subjective activity, dependent,
for example, upon organizational levels of risk aversion, 96 a centralized
agency is not qualified to engage in this behavior. Strategies created to
manage risk effectively are best handled at the organizational level because
190. Id. at 65.
191. Diminution of cost, associated with both scale economies and the sharing of expenditures that
are spread among finns, is associated with reduction of institutional risk. Joint venture activity directed
at cost reduction will also reduce each firm's per-project nsk, yielding greater willingness to engage in
a wider portfolio of otherwise unacceptably risky endeavors. For a discussion of risk reduction through
joint venture activity, see Contractor, Dispersion, supra note 185, at 73.
192. Philip Friedman et al., External vs. Internal Knowledge Acquisition: Joint Venture Activity and
R&D Intensity, 31 J. ECON. & Bus. 103, 109 (1979).
193. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECrioN OF INvENTIVE AcrIvITY 609 (R. Nelson ed., 1962); Robert Pitofsky, Proposals
for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 240 (1992).
194. This is because basic research will tend to yield unpatentable knowledge or information rather
than patentable products or processes.
195. Sanford V Berg & Philip Friedman, Joint Ventures, Competition, and Technological
.Complementarities: Evidence from Chemicals, 43 S. ECON. J. 1330, 1331 (1977).
196. For a discussion of variations in organizational nsk profiles, see MAX H. BAZERMAN,
JUDGEMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECIsIoN MAKING 66-67 (2d ed. 1990).
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desirable risk postures are an organizational artifact, idiosyncratic to the
particular firm.'97
Second, compulsory collaboration will tend to increase rather than reduce
systematic risk. Organizational receptiveness to externally imposed collabora-
tion will range from highly desirable to highly undesirable, and we can
assume that compelled alliances will be distributed in some manner across the
continuum. Whereas voluntary alliances are entered because they are viewed
by the firms as yielding a net benefit and therefore as being essentially
desirable, some compulsory alliances will be resisted, and viewed as
undesirable.
Companies engaged in unwanted collaboration will view the mandate as
creating rather than ameliorating risk. This means that while voluntary
collaboration may be motivated by its potential to reduce risk, forced
collaboration will tend to increase systematic risk. As net risk reduction
encourages an organization to engage in creative and innovative behaviors,
compulsory collaboration that increases perceived risk will also tend to
dampen creative and innovative activities. While encouragement of voluntary
cooperation has the potential to act as a spur to innovation, cooperation under
regulatory compulsion can be expected to reduce innovation.
D. Maximizing Competitive Incentives and
Accelerating Technological Advances
While charges of excessive profiteering on the part of pharmaceutical
companies 9 ' reflect real problems in current patent policy,'99  the
connection between potential profits and investment incentives remains a
compelling force. This relationship is examined through the following
propositions:
(1) Maintaining an essentially competitive market environment is vital to
technological innovation, as firms are encouraged to develop innovative
technologies as a means of surmounting entry barriers. In a competitive
industry,"0 an equilibrium develops between companies seeking to inhibit
competition by erecting barriers to entry and others seeking to overcome those
barriers by developing innovative competencies or products that will yield
sufficient advantage to carve a niche in otherwise tenaciously guarded
197. Id.
198. See Marc Pitzke, AIDS Activists Target Big Business at Conference, REUTER LiBR. REP., June
I1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File (describing the protest activities of ACT UP
at the 1993 International Conference on AIDS, in response to allegedly excessive profiteenng by
pharmaceutical companies).
199. See Salbu, AIDS anid Drug Pricing, supra note I (arguing that unfettered monopoly power
conferred upon private corporations may not be justified when substantial governmental research
subsidies have supported the R&D efforts that resulted in the patented product).
200. I refer here to an industry that operates in an open, unfettered market, such that natural
competitive forces operate, rather than centralized governmental planning.
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markets.2"' Competitive industries, in which companies can adopt uncoerced,
individualized strategies, are essential to both the incentive of entrenched
firms to erect entry barriers and the incentive of newcomers to transcend those
barriers through competitive advantage based on technological innovation." 2
Proponents of federally centralized research overlook the impetus to
innovation that results from industry competition. They presume that there is
a finite pool of AIDS researchers, and that government organization of this
pool will yield greater efficiency and effectiveness. Yet the pool is not finite,
as some firms decide to develop high technology R&D projects as a response
to competitive dynamics within their industry 203
(2) Maintaining an essentially competitive market environment is vital to
technological innovation, as firms are encouraged to engage in biotechnology
research as a means of seeking economic growth and managerial stability
Advances in biotechnology, including pharmaceutical applications, will
provide one of the potentially fruitful, profitable industries for economic
growth in the twenty-first century 204 According to one study, leadership in
biotechnology will be a significant source of competitive advantage in the
foreseeable future.0 5
Hamilton observes that firms in competitive markets engage in substantial
strategic alliance activity during the early stages of biotechnology R&D.20 6
They become more independent and engage in fewer alliances during the later
commercialization stages.207 These findings are consistent with the balance
between cooperative and competitive dynamics and incentives; left to their
own devices, firms appear to recognize the advantages of early collaboration
201. For detailed discussion of competitive industry analysis and the nature of entry barriers in
developing competitive advantage, see MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPErTIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR
ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS (1980) [hereinafter PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY].
202. For discussion of the use of technological innovation as a competitive tool, see EDWIN
MANSFIELD ET AL., THE PRODUCTION AND APPLICATION OF NEW INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY (1977);
Michael E. Porter, Technology and Competitive Advantage, 60 J. BUS. STRATEGY 60 (1985); Michael
E. Porter, The Technological Dimension of Competitive Strategy, in I RESEARCH ON TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT AND POLICY (Richard S. Rosenbloom ed., 1983); Alan M. Kantrow, The
Strategy-Technology Connection, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 6.
203. If some decisions to engage in AIDS research function predominantly as a competitive strategy
aimed at overcoming entry barriers, then the assumption that there is a finite amount of AIDS research
to be apportioned by the government is erroneous. To the extent that the government replaces the
invisible hand of industry competition with its visible hand of federal policy, it is likely to disrupt the
competitive equilibrium between entry barrier erection and offensive technological innovation strategies
in response to these barriers. In the process, the dilution of competitive dynamics will tend to diminish
the pool of companies engaged in cutting-edge AIDS research as the group of "entry barrier reactors"
lose their incentives. Simply stated, the loss of free competition will eliminate the defensive strategy of
building entry barriers, which will then eliminate the need for offensive innovation reactions directed
towards defeating entry barriers. In effect, the reduction or elimination of the competitive environment
also reduces or eliminates an important incentive to engage in technological innovation.
204. William F. Hamilton, Corporate Strategies for Managing Emerging Technologies, 7 TECH.
SOC'Y 197, 199 (1985).
205. Emily A. Arakaki, A Study of the U.S. Competitive Position in Biotechnology, in HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES: PROFILES AND OUTLOOKS: BIOTECHNOLOGY 39 (International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, July 1984).




and subsequent independent, competitive positions. In other words, the market
successfully moderates the simultaneous but somewhat conflicting roles of
collaborative and competitive positioning.
Naturally occurring, voluntary network activity may have economic
properties that serve relational governance functions. Kogut has noted that
individual transactions among collaborators may not be as important
moderators of behavior as bundles of contractual commitments and ties among
members of a strategic network, suggesting that relational stability may be
more a function of economic relationships than of particular transactions."'
If collaborative activity is in fact governed and managed by a web of market
incentives rather than by. specific contractual arrangements, then policy that
promotes unbridled freedom of choice should create more stable alliances than
policy that essentially eliminates economic functions by centralizing the
processes of resource commitment and allocation.
While interfirm dynamics produce a naturally self-sustaining balance of
relations, the cruder centralized cooperation of a Manhattan Project lacks the
self-adjustment mechanism derived from competitive forces. If a designated
AIDS Czar were to develop a plan for mandatory collaborative research
activity over an extended time frame, companies directed to do designated
research and development would lose the autonomy to determine for
themselves the nature and limits of the cooperative efforts. Unfortunately, an
AIDS Czar overseeing hundreds of interlocked research efforts would lack
both the intimate understanding of each project and the private incentives to
determine the optimal moment for shifting from a cooperative to a competitive
stance. The official who has been deputized to enhance cooperative efforts in
AIDS research is also unlikely to view competition and its resulting incentives
as the mission of a Manhattan Project II. Both by its design and by virtue of
the inefficient dynamics of centralized government management, even a good-
faith effort to coordinate AIDS research would inevitably reduce the
effectiveness of private incentives that are crucial to rapid technological
advancement.
Because efficient technological advancement is the product of fundamentally
competitive environments, 2 0' the benefits of collaboration should be
subsumed within, and limited by, the fundamental tenets of capitalist
competition. Cooperation, in this context, is best viewed as a competitive tool
or strategy Cooperation is vital to the expedience of AIDS research, and can
provide the companies that engage in astute cooperative efforts with
economies and knowledge linkages. 210 Yet, if we recognize the fundamental
virtue of competitive markets in facilitating the quick development and
208. Bruce Kogut, The Stability ofJont Ventures: Reciprocity and Competitive Rivalry, 38 J. INDUS.
ECON. 183, 195 (1989) [hereinafter Kogut, Stability].
209. For discussions of the allocational and operating efficiencies provided by competition, see
William S. Comanor & Harvey Leibenstem, Allocative Efficiency, X-Efficiency and the Measurement
of Welfare Losses, 36 ECONOMICA 304 (1969); Richard M. Cyert & Morrs H. DeGroot, An Analysis
of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 24 (1973).
210. See supra notes 160-72, 189-94 and accompanying text.
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dispersion of new technologies,2" we must also circumscribe the role of
cooperation within a competitive context. Cooperation thus becomes one of
numerous elective strategies to be employed within a basically efficient
market.
This means that the value which we must hold sacrosanct is the value of
free, uncoerced competition. Companies seeking to maximize value in the free
market will engage in mutually beneficial, voluntary collaborative efforts in
order to gain the benefits of shared R&D.2" 2 The capitalist market is not
hostile or unreceptive to cooperation, as witnessed by the ever-increasing
incidence of high-technology joint ventures. A public policy decision to
support voluntary, private collaboration is a decision to retain intact the
compelling force of capitalist incentives on cooperative technological
innovation. A national research agenda is not needed to provide collaborative
incentives. Instead, market freedoms are necessary to maintain the industry
incentives which drive companies to seek competitive advantage through
technological superiority
(3) Maintaining an essentially competitive environment will improve the
quality of cooperative endeavors by fostering institutionalized incentives to
refrain from opportunistic behavior and cheating." 3 Assuming that some
degree of collaboration has the potential to promote rather than hinder
progress towards a cure for AIDS, companies involved in any alliance must
constantly assess the extent to which they are willing to share information and
the point at which individual self-interest takes precedence over cooperative
behavior. Stated differently, R&D collaboration in pharmaceutical research is
consensual, and it is subject to temptations for individuals to act opportun-
istically, to exploit free rider opportunities, and even to cheat. Like any other
network of organizations engaged in a hybrid of collaboration and competi-
tion, a consortium created to accelerate research findings through any sharing
of information needs to coordinate and control the activities of its members
through some contractual or institutional control mechanism.
A potential cost of any collaborative transaction may be charged in the form
of aggressive behavior that is damaging to the interests of co-collabora-
tors. 4 Transaction theory of institutional economics suggests that collabora-
tive efficiency is increased when any partnership reduces aggressive behavior
or encourages parties to forbear from engaging in opportunistic behavior
which diminishes the overall effectiveness of the venture.2'5 Voluntary
211 . See supra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
213. Costs associated with opportunism, cheating, and aggression are considered predominantly by
companies entenng strategic alliances. However, these costs affect collaboration among government and
university laboratones as well. The rewards and perquisites that exist in the scientific community,
including monetary rewards, recognition, consulting opportunities in private industry, and prospects of
receiving larger grants in the future, act as incentives for all scientists to act self-seekmgly. These
dynamics are magnified as the stakes grow and the limelight focuses on particular areas of research that
are viewed as socially critical, such as AIDS research.




strategic alliances have greater potential to mitigate the costs of aggressive
behavior than do compulsory alliances, for three reasons:
(a) Aggressive behavior is more likely to occur among those who have been
forced together than among those who have chosen to engage in a research
partnership. Not all voluntary alliances are made in heaven. An organization
may enter an alliance on the strength of one factor, such as complementary
R&D capabilities, despite weaknesses among other factors, such as organiza-
tional or interpersonal compatibility Still, on average, aggressive behavior
should occur less frequently among voluntary collaborators in a free market
than among coerced collaborators under governmental fiat. Some voluntary
alliances are made in heaven, and the quality of fit at every level is the
product of a significant investment in courtship and negotiation.21 s Because
some superior voluntary alliances owe their superiority to careful planning
rather than accident, and because the companies themselves are in the best
position to understand all the peculiar factors relevant to the success of their
own alliances, overall organizational compatibility should be higher among
voluntary collaborators than among coerced collaborators. Collaborative
compatibility will act as a natural inducement to good will rather than
suspicion, cooperation rather than tension.
(b) Assuming arguendo that a voluntary alliance and a coerced alliance are
characterized by identical levels of compatibility along every important
dimension, the very processes themselves will result in differentiated levels
of good will. I refer specifically here to the idea that, ceterls paribus, levels
of resentment associated with any relationship or transaction will be greater
under circumstances of compulsion and constraint than under conditions of
free choice. As a result, even when all indicia of compatibility are identical,
we should expect higher levels of genuine cooperative spirit among freely
chosen alliances than among forced alliances.
(c) Voluntary ventures provide both contractual and organizational sources
of control over opportunistic behavior.
Corporate management, accustomed to increasing levels of joint venture
activity, has developed contractual means to reduce the potential for
opportunistic behavior. The creation of reciprocal penalties, rewards for
altruistic behavior within the collaborative dyad, bundling of commitments,
and residual risk sharing provides a means for management to curb anti-
competitive activity 217
Government entities could certainly attempt to mimic the use of these tools.
Nevertheless, administrative and bureaucratic unwieldiness may impede the
efforts of government agencies to reproduce the contractual protections which
private organizations can tailor to their idiosyncratic needs.
216. SALBU, STRATEGIC IMPACT, supra note 165.
217. For a detailed discussion of these incentives, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION (1984); THoMAs C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); Peter J. Buckley
& Mark Casson, A Theory of Co-operation in International Business, MGMT. INT'L REv., Special Issue,
19, 22-23 (1988); Kogut, Stability, supra note 208; and Salbu & Brahm, Strategic Considerations, supra
note 158, at 296-302.
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Voluntary ventures provide natural organizational incentives to avoid
aggressive and opportunistic behavior which are missing from compulsory
collaborative arrangements. Scholars have recognized the importance of
reputational effects as natural monitors of behavior within open collaborative
markets."' Specifically, the prospective need to bargain in an open market
for advantageous relationships and transactions acts as an incentive to
maintain a good reputation in order to be viewed by potential future
collaborators as an attractive partner."9 Forced collaboration would
eliminate or reduce the choice of future partners, and thus the incentive to
invest in reputation by dealing openly, fairly, and with forbearance to
opportunism.22 ° As more future alignments are orchestrated by a government
agency on the basis of topical synergies and efficiencies, organizations lose
the ability to exploit reputation as an asset in future negotiations. All
laboratory facilities looking ahead to a system of nonvoluntary cooperation
will foresee less future return on an investment in reputation, and will be less
likely to protect that reputation by placing cooperative values above
competitive values.
V. THE NATURE OF ANTITRUST LAW AS APPLIED TO
JOINT VENTURES, AND THE NEED FOR
MODIFICATION OF ANTITRUST RESTRICTIONS IN
ORDER TO FACILITATE AND ENCOURAGE PRIVATE,
VOLUNTARY COLLABORATION
While voluntary strategic alliances are potentially powerful tools to
facilitate and expedite AIDS research, our antitrust laws encourage competi-
tion and limit cooperation to an extent that valuable cooperative efforts may
be impeded. To explain this effect, I shall examine first the balance between
cooperation and competition, and then the deficiencies of our antitrust laws
as they limit the attractiveness of voluntary alliances.
The cooperative element of technological transfer ventures is limited by the
competitive dynamic of firms operating within the same industry 22 , Reich
and Mankin have observed that technology transfer activity within joint
ventures is often furtive and tacit rather than express and condoned.222 This
phenomenon should not surprise us, given that cooperation is primarily viewed
as a competitive tool in capitalist markets. Arms-length relations will naturally
218. Buckley & Casson, supra note 217, at 23-24.
219. Id.
220. For a discussion of the impact of the free market in restraining opportunism, see Charles W.L.
Hill, Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications for Transaction Cost Theory, 15
ACAD. MGr~f. REv. 500 (1990).
221. See PORTER, CoMPE'rrIvE STRATEGY, supra note 201.
222. Robert B. Reich & Eric D. Mankin, Joint Ventures with Japan Give Away Our Future, HARV.
Bus. REv., Mar-Apr. 1986, at 78, 84. The authors refer to the trading of technology within American-
Japanese joint ventures in terms of a Trojan horse, suggesting that technology sharing in competitive
markets tends to be an activity of stealth rather than open and encouraged behavior.
1994]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
encourage self-protective and opportunistic behaviors antithetic to good-faith
sharing, whereas increasingly hierarchical collaborative arrangements will
reduce adversarial behavior as the increase in organizational alignment
augments the sphere of overlapping organizational interest. Companies
engaged in market-centered collaboration, such as contracting or licensing,
have few shared interests and can be expected to collaborate reluctantly, with
one eye always monitoring competitive position relative to the collaborator.
As cooperation becomes more hierarchical, from market contract to joint
venture to merger, common interests expand and competitive postures
diminish, encouraging wholehearted, good-faith sharing of information.
While the movement of firms away from market competition and towards
hierarchical, collaborative identity reduces interfirm rivalry and increases
interfirm cooperation, it also has the potential to diminish intra-industry
competition. Although the former dynamic should logically expedite the
industry-wide progress of AIDS research, antitrust legislation has arisen from
concern that the latter dynamic may impede that progress. In determining a
reasonable public policy to facilitate AIDS research, we must examine the
nature of these two dynamics. In the discussion that follows, I suggest that
collaborative efficiencies of R&D venturing are significant, while impedi-
ments to meaningful competition resulting from R&D venturing are insignifi-
cant. Unfortunately, although hierarchies establish potentially closer relations
than market transactions, federal public policy discourages joint ventures for
consolidating R&D.
A. Market Efficiency Versus Market Power Hypotheses
to Explain the Incidence of Technology Ventures
Scholars have posited two potentially driving forces behind the development
of knowledge-acquisition ventures among high technology firms. I shall label
these forces in terms of two hypotheses: the market efficiency hypothesis and
the market power hypothesis. Under the market efficiency hypothesis,
knowledge acquisition ventures are established primarily to achieve efficien-
cies in the development of technological skills and knowledge.223 Such
efficiencies, discussed in the various subparts above, include cost-sharing,
data-sharing, and risk-sharing. If firms enter strategic alliances to gain such
efficiencies, the marketplace logically stands to benefit from the activity, as
efficiencies are passed on to consumers in such forms as reduced costs and
expedited product-to-market processes.
Under the market power hypothesis, knowledge-acquisition joint venture
activity is motivated primarily by the desire and ability to consolidate
resources into power bases substantial enough to affect or even control market
223. For a discussion of market efficiency explanations of joint venture activity, see DAViD C.
MOWERY, INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE VENTURES IN U.S. MANUFACTURING (1988); and Gary
Hamel et al., Collaborate with Your Competitors-and Win, HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 133.
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mechanisms, such as supply costs, labor costs, and product pricing.2 24
Ventures achieve profitability not by creating and exploiting efficiencies that
are ultimately valuable to consumers, but rather by reducing competition to
the extent that normal market control of supply and price becomes subverted.
If the market power hypothesis of knowledge-acquisition ventures is correct,
the loss of competitive incentives and controls can be expected to harm
consumers. Immunity from competitive pressures could effectively eliminate
the race to invent increasingly effective products.
The market efficiency and the market power hypotheses are not mutually
exclusive. Undoubtedly, size relative to suppliers, buyers, and competitors will
tend to result in a concomitant increase in power.225 Likewise, efficiencies
cannot be discounted as incentives to cooperate in high technology indus-
tries.226 While some degree of market power will be established in tandem
with many mergers and alliances, the threat of market control or market
domination is less than the cost of discouraging valuable efficiencies and
synergies associated with cooperative efforts in the area of AIDS research.
In the following subpart, I discuss the present status of American antitrust
laws as they relate to voluntary alliances such as joint ventures and strategic
networks. I examine the degree to which such alliances threaten the public
welfare, as well as the benefits to be gained by encouraging such alliances.
Specifically, I contend that the danger of market power alliances is insignifi-
cant in the context of AIDS research. For this reason, and because of the
potential market efficiency benefits of AIDS research ventures, I recommend
modification of the present laws in order to eliminate the chilling effect of
current policies.
B. American Antitrust Law as It Relates to
Voluntary Alliances
Joint venture activity focusing on AIDS R&D is unlikely to trigger most of
the antitrust provisions that may apply to other strategic alliances. While joint
ventures are subject to federal restrictions prohibiting price fixing and market
division, these specific distribution-end activities do not ordinarily occur
during the upstream stages of research that currently characterize the scientific
investigation of AIDS.227
224. For a discussion of market power hypotheses explaining joint venture activity in high value-
added industries, see Richard Brahn & Steven R. Salbu, Beyond Strategic Alliances: Reconstructing
Market Power in International Business, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR BusINESs AND SOCIETY:
1993 PROCEEDINGs 193, 194-96 (Jean Pasquero & Denis Collins eds., 1993).
225. Indeed, the competitive strategy literature derived from industrial economics recommends the
establishment of power over suppliers and buyers in the process ofjockeying for competitive position
with industry rivals. PORTER, CompETnvE STRATEGY, supra note 201.
226. See supra note 213.
227. See infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
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A more likely source of potential antitrust scrutiny is section one of the
Sherman Act ("Section One").228 Section One prohibits contracts, combina-
tions, and conspiracies in restraint of trade.229 Currently, joint venture
activity is assessed using the "rule of reason," and violates Section One if it
results in significant and unjustified reduction of competition"i In Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.," 1 the Supreme
Court stated that violation of Section One arises from the concern that certain
concentrative behavior has a tendency "to restrict competition and decrease
output.123 2 Collaborative behavior is prohibited under the rule of reason if
it is "'unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions.' 23
Unfortunately, firms may have difficulty determining, in anticipation,
whether an alliance they are considering is permissible under such vague
standards. Because application of the rule of reason entails case-by-case
assessment of the competitive impact of each collaborative effort, prospective
collaborators lack clear precepts by which to determine whether a proposed
alliance is in compliance with Section One. 4 In this vein, Jorde and Teece
observe, "the parameters of the rule of reason analysis are ambiguous and
unstructured, resulting in uncertainty and unpredictability "235 While the
Justice Department has provided guidelines for merger activity compliance
with Section One,236 the lack of parallel guidelines for strategic alliances
renders this less collaborative organizational form ironically more risky than
full-blown merger activity 237 As a result, private firms may be dissuaded
from engaging in effective voluntary alliances.
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.").
229. Id.
230. In other words, the rule of reason engages in a case-by-case evaluation of the overall
competitive impact of a joint venture. For a detailed discussion of the rule of reason, see Robert H.
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE LJ. 373
(1966).
231. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
232. Id. at 19-20.
233. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978) (quoting Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911)).
234. See James Ball, Note, Rule of Reason Analysis in Intellectual Property Joit Ventures, 68 DENV.
U. L. REV. 315, 317 (1991) ("[T1he guarantee of rule of reason analysis may be of little solace to
potential joint venturers so long as the courts, with their limited business savvy, are given free reign to
determine what is 'reasonable.").
235. Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Competition and Cooperation: Striking the Right Balance,
31 CAL. MGMT. REV. 25, 34 (1989).
236. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (1992). The guidelines explain the
Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission's utilization of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
("HHI"), which measures industry concentration. The Justice Department provides guidance regarding
the degree of HHI concentration likely to trigger challenges to merger activity. Reduced ambiguity leads
to reduction in risk for mergers below the guidelines margin, and concomitant reduction of chilling
effect upon lawful merger activity. Since joint venture activity operates without such guidelines, there
is no administrative effort to mitigate the chilling effect on prospective strategic alliances.
237. Jorde & Teece, supra note 235, at 35.
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Another potential source of joint venture liability is section two of the
Sherman Act ("Section Two"),23 which prohibits the monopolization of
trade or commerce.239 Liability under Section Two ordinarily requires intent
to monopolize24 0 and a finding that the combination in question results in
sufficient market power to control prices or exclude competition.24 Section
Two liability is not limited to mergers, but applies as well to joint ventures
involving "all or most of the firms in an industry -242
Like Section One, Section Two is likely to curtail the voluntary collabora-
tive activities of private groups such as the fifteen large drug companies that
comprise the Inter-Company Collaboration for AIDS Drug Development.243
Even at the early stages of cooperation, as the members of the Inter-Company
Collaboration limit their activities to .the sharing of clinical data and drug
supplies, the group is concerned about potential antitrust liability244 If an
important goal of AIDS research is to encourage rather than discourage both
public and private collaboration, then there is a tension between the market
protection function of Section Two and the desire to increase laboratory
cooperation. Unless the application of Section Two serves a real market
protection function as applied to AIDS research alliances, it should be
eliminated in order to reduce the fear that accompanies intra-industry
teamwork.
Joint venture activity is also covered under section seven of the Clayton Act
("Section Seven"), 245 as illustrated in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
Co. 246 Section Seven forbids the direct or indirect acquisition of the assets
of another corporation if the effect "may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly "247 Potential liability under Section
Seven may have effects analogous to the effects of Sections One and Two.
Because collaborative ventures may later be found to have reduced competi-
tion, the risk of any venture is increased, and companies are discouraged from
joining research forces.
As demonstrated in the following discussion, Section One, Section Two, and
Section Seven do little to protect competitive markets when applied to AIDS
238. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
239. Id. ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.").
240. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 145-46 (1985).
241. Id. at 56.
242. Joseph F. Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary
Assessment, 21 ANTITRusT BULL. 453, 455 (1976).
243. For a discussion of this alliance, see supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
244. See Waldholz, supra note 35, at B6 ("Several researchers said they hoped the [Inter-Company]
drug companies might also share details of drug discoveries prior to human testing. But the companies
said such a collaboration might violate antitrust laws.').
245. Clayton Act ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988))
[hereinafter Clayton Act].
246. Penn-Olin, 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), aff'd per curtain by an equally divided court, 389
U.S. 308 (1967).
247. Clayton Act, supra note 245, at § 7.
1994]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
research combinations, but they are likely to have a detrimental impact by
discouraging vital collaborative activity
C. Why AIDS Research Ventures Should Be Exempt
from Antitrust Regulations
As ambiguous standards exacerbate the risk faced by potential allies, the
threat of antitrust prosecution under both the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act may have a chilling effect on collaborative activity 248 While the Acts
have a net effect of discouraging cooperative arrangements249 and hence
hinder AIDS research, R&D ventures in fact pose little or no threat to
competition for two reasons:
(1) Upstream behavior, such as R&D activity, poses less threat to
competition than downstream behavior. Thomas Piraino has observed that
alliances affecting competition, pricing, market-domination, and output occur
downstream, at the production stage.250 During the R&D stage, collaboration
is so attenuated from market activity as to pose little serious anti-competitive
threat.25'
In particular, when a potential technology requires the achievement of
substantial basic research, as is currently the case in regard to AIDS
treatments, cooperation is "precompetitive, ' '25 2 and therefore far removed
from the concerns of antitrust laws.253 The potential for R&D venturing to
become production venturing is diluted by the need for basic research
advancement 254 separating upstream from downstream behaviors.2 5 In this
248. For a discussion of this effect, see Andrew C. Hruska, A Broad Market Approach to Antitrust
Product Market Definition in Innovative Industries, 102 YALE LJ. 305 (1992).
249. See William J. Murphy, Interfirm Cooperation in a Competitive Economic System, 26 AM. Bus.
L.J. 29, 47 (1988) ("[T]he perception of potential antitrust exposure has hung over the heads of
cooperative R&D participants like the sword of Damocles. [B]usiness executives and their legal
advisors can hardly be faulted for their caution with regard to cooperative research and development
activities.").
250. Thomas A. Piramo, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or Merger Analysis: A New Antitrust
Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1, 37 (1991).
251. Id.
252. Jeremy Main, Malang Global Alliances Work, FORTUNE, Dec. 17, 1990, at 121, 126.
253. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Note, Transnational Production Joint Ventures and United States
Antitrust Law: Evaluating the Proposed National Cooperative Production Amendments, 28 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 119, 127 (1993) ("It is fairly well settled that cooperative research poses minimal threats to
competition.").
254. After the basic research that most scientists believe must still be done to investigate AIDS,
marketing of products will be delayed by the stages of applied research, invention, development, and
commercial application. For a discussion of these stages of product development as they relate to
antitrust considerations, see W. Kip Viscusi Er AL., EcoNoMics OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 83
(1992).
255. Technically, it is difficult to categorize research performed by pharmaceutical companies as
basic or applied. Under the National Science Foundation ("NSF") definitions, basic research is done "for
the advancement of scientific knowledge not having specific immediate commercial objectives, although
such investigations may be in fields of present or potential interest [to the firm]." The NSF defines
applied research as "[i]nvestigations directed to the discovery of new scientific knowledge having
specific commercial objectives with respect to products or processes." NAT'L SCI. FOUNDATION,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRY: 1987, 2 (1989).
[Vol. 69"425
MANHATTAN PROJECT FOR AIDS
vein, Stockdale has noted that "an RJV [research joint venture] directed at
basic or precommercial research is likely to generate significant benefits
without imposing substantial social costs. . [B]ecause basic research and
precommercial R&D are distanced from the competitive concerns of the
market, the RJV will not likely spur collusion.- 256
(2) International R&D activity in high-technology areas such as AIDS
research diminishes the possibility that firms can unilaterally control markets.
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department recognizes that the market
for scientific research today is global rather than domestic. 7 As a result,
alliances between American firms cannot realistically confer market
domination. Moreover, ordinary international alliances are also unlikely to
inhibit competition as increasingly scattered markets become resistant to
unilateral control.
Legislators have recognized, to a limited degree, that while the threat posed
by collaborative R&D activity is small, the potential chilling effect of antitrust
law upon valuable R&D cooperation may be substantial. In 1984, Congress
passed the National Cooperative Research Act ("NCRA"), 5 8 purportedly to
encourage collaborative research by reducing the risk generated by threat of
antitrust prosecution. Unfortunately, the NCRA is a weak mechanism for the
achievement of these laudable ends. The NCRA stipulates that R&D ventures
will be evaluated under the rule of reason and not be deemed illegal per
se.259 As one commentator has observed, this provision adds no new
incentives to engage in R&D collaboration since it simply mimics existing
law 260 The NCRA also permits R&D ventures to register so that any
antitrust damages arising from the venture will be limited to single damages,
interest, and legal costs. 26' In other words, the NCRA merely exempts
properly registered ventures from treble damages liability.
The NCRA may be more important for its symbolic value than for its actual
economic impact. While the NCRA manifests Congress' desire to encourage
R&D ventures by reducing unwarranted regulatory incursion,262 the mere
Whether we classify current AIDS research as basic, by virtue of the poor prognosis for immediate
commercial applications, or as precommercial applied research, in recognition of the ultimate market
goals, the development of a cure for AIDS will likely be stalled until more advances in basic research
provide an adequate foundation for realistic applications. See supra notes 128-29.
In terms of antitrust law, the important point, regardless of classification or terminology, is that the
dangers of anticompetitive behavior in the marketing of relevant products are several steps away.
256. Donald I. Stockdale, Jr., Antitrust and International Competitiveness: Is Encouraging
Production Joint Ventures Worth the Cost?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 279-80 (1992).
257. See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations-1988, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,109.10, at 20589-3 (Nov. 10, 1988).
258. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301, 4302 (1988).
259. Id.
260. Christopher O.B. Wright, The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984: A New Antitrust
Regimefor Joint Research and Development Ventures, I HIGH TECH. L.J. 133, 178 (1986).
261. Jorde & Teece, supra note 235.
262. See id. at 31 ("The NCRA is a significant piece of legislation, as it demonstrates that Congress
has recognized the importance of innovation to the American economy and to America's competitive-
ness in a world marketplace. Congress also grasped that traditional antitrust treatment of innovation and
cooperative innovative arrangements was inhibiting desirable activities").
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elimination of the threat of treble damages is unlikely to increase significantly
the incidence of such ventures. The small number of R&D ventures registered
under the NCRA during its first three years of operation263 may reflect the
industry's belief that the incentives provided by the act are inadequate.
AIDS research facilities should be exempted by statute from prosecution
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The benefits of voluntary collaboration,
compared with governmentally coerced collaboration, are documented in Part
IV These include the creation of technological synergies, the rapid dispersion
of technological information, the promotion of transnational cooperation, the
exploitation of economies of scale, the rationalization of research efforts, the
dilution of cost and risk, and the maintenance of essential competitive
incentives relative to compulsory cooperation.
Cooperative ventures may be encouraged in AIDS R&D with little risk of
downstream market concentration that stifles competition or drives price
escalation. If there are substantial benefits to be gained from encouraging
voluntary R&D alliances, and none to be gained from discouraging them, then
the disincentive that currently exists in the form of antitrust scrutiny should
be eliminated. A statutory exemption of AIDS research facilities from antitrust
liability costs nothing, and eliminates a source of risk that is likely to deter
some facilities from joining forces.
CONCLUSION
The policy recommendations in these pages are derived from an attempt to
reconcile the sometimes conflicting values of competition and cooperation. I
have argued that cooperation, while indisputably an essential element of AIDS
R&D progress, is best viewed as subordinate to the value of competition,
because while competition begets cooperation, cooperation does not in itself
create competitive incentives.
Notwithstanding a proclivity toward competitive values, I have suggested
that the NIH engage in restrained coordination of AIDS research by
rationalizing strategic planning, to improve the manner in which grant funds
are allocated. I have posited a method for improving governmental control
over federally subsidized research activity, emphasizing a need to limit that
control in order to avoid bureaucratic impediments to scientific progress, and
to maximize respect for scientific autonomy and competitive incentives.
My proposals include, as well, a recommendation that joint ventures for
AIDS R&D be exempted from antitrust scrutiny under Sections One and Two
of the Sherman Act, and Section Seven of the Clayton Act. This suggestion
is derived from a detailed examination of the benefits to be gained from
voluntary AIDS research collaboration as well as an analysis of the reasons
why such activity poses little or no anticompetitive threat. Consistent with my
263. Id. at 33 (summarizing Federal Register data on NCRA registration from January 1985-June
1988 inclusive, and indicating that only 2.7% of biotechnology ventures had registered during that initial
period).
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earlier observation that competitive forces should be viewed as a viable and
superior broker of collaborative possibilities, the recommendation to remove
AIDS research from antitrust scrutiny reflects a broad regulatory orientation
toward eliminating useless impediments to freely chosen strategic alliances.
Undoubtedly, expediting the progress of AIDS research is a global priority
Because the stakes are so high, we can expect that activists will continue to
clamor for better results, achieved more quickly As we strive to meet these
ends, it behooves us to remember that the competitive dynamics of capitalist
markets are the best source of rapid technological breakthrough. In developing
the policies needed to expedite the search for a cure, we must restrain the
desire to achieve progress through excessive coercion. Under this reasoning,
I recommend restrained regulatory coordination that encourages effective free
market responses to the AIDS crisis.

